DO NOT DELETE

2/17/2011 9:49:21 AM

ARTICLES
REVERSE INCORPORATION OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
JOSEPH BLOCHER*

ABSTRACT
State supreme courts and the United States Supreme Court are the
independent and final arbiters of their respective constitutions, and may
therefore take different approaches to analogous issues under those
constitutions. Such issues are common because the documents were
modeled after one another and contain many of the same guarantees. In
answering them, state courts have, as a matter of practice, generally
adopted federal constitutional doctrine as their own. Federal courts, by
contrast, have largely ignored state constitutional law when interpreting
the federal Constitution. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, to take one
recent and high-profile example, the Court declined to adopt the state
courts’ near-unanimous conclusion that the proper standard of review for
regulations of the “individual” right to keep and bear arms is a form of
“reasonableness” review.
In an age of growing international comparativism, this lack of
intranational borrowing is striking, especially since state constitutions
served as the template for the federal Constitution and generally protect
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the same rights as are found in the federal Bill of Rights. In a constitutional
system that claims to be committed to federalism and respect for the states,
why is it that state constitutional law has had such a slight impact on
federal constitutional doctrine? This Article seeks to answer that question,
and suggests that in certain circumstances federal courts should look to
state constitutional law when faced with analogous federal constitutional
controversies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
State constitutions and the federal Constitution overlap to a
considerable degree, and the courts with final interpretive authority over
them often confront the same questions: Should unconstitutionally obtained
evidence be admissible in court?1 Do consenting adults have a
constitutional right to engage in private sexual activity?2 By what standard
should the constitutionality of gun control be judged?3 In answering those
questions, scholars,4 state courts,5 and even Supreme Court Justices6 have
repeatedly noted that state constitutions need not be interpreted in line with
the federal Constitution. And yet state courts have relied heavily—at times
completely and explicitly—on federal constitutional doctrine when
interpreting their own charters, even when the language, history, and intent
of the latter are distinct.
The opposite, however, is not even remotely true. With a few notable
exceptions, the Supreme Court7 has largely ignored state doctrine when
constructing federal constitutional rules, even in areas in which the states
have a widely shared and well-articulated constitutional doctrine
addressing an issue on which the Supreme Court itself has never
1.
2.
3.
4.

See infra Part IV.B.1.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
See infra Part IV.C.
See, e.g., Joseph R. Grodin, Commentary, Some Reflections on State Constitutions, 15
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 391, 400 (1988) (“[N]either logic nor history requires that [state courts] accord
state constitutional language the same meaning as the United States Supreme Court has accorded a
comparable provision of the federal Constitution.”); Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court’s
Shadow: Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REV. 353,
402 (1984) [hereinafter Williams, In the Supreme Court’s Shadow] (criticizing the lockstep approach
explained in Part II.B); Robert F. Williams, Methodology Problems in Enforcing State Constitutional
Rights, 3 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 143, 171–76 (1987) (same).
5. See generally Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus—Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L.
REV. 165 (1984) (arguing, as Oregon Supreme Court justice, for robust state constitutionalism and its
significance in current federal constitutional law).
6. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977) [hereinafter Brennan, State Constitutions] (calling for state courts
to provide broader protection of state constitutional rights than the Supreme Court was then providing
for federal constitutional rights); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 761, 763, 777 (1961) [hereinafter Brennan, The Bill of Rights] (describing the tension between
federalism and the “incorporation” doctrine, and concluding that “[i]t is reason for deep satisfaction that
many of the states effectively enforce the counterparts in state constitutions of the specifics of the Bill
of Rights”).
7. For simplicity’s sake, I will refer to the United States Supreme Court as the “Supreme Court”
or the “Court” throughout this Article.
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pronounced. The relative absence of state constitutional law as persuasive
authority in federal cases is all the more striking because state legislation
has received a substantial amount of scholarly and even judicial attention,
at least in certain legal contexts.8 For example, the Court has found that the
“clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is
the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.”9 State constitutions,
by contrast, have largely been left out in the cold. Why, in a system that
claims to be committed to federalism and respect for the states, are state
supreme courts’ interpretations of parallel constitutional provisions so
thoroughly ignored? If states have a constitutionally guaranteed role as
laboratories for constitutional innovation,10 why does the Court discard the
lab results?
The easy answers are insufficient. The Supremacy Clause11 does not
require the Supreme Court to turn a blind eye to state constitutional law.
State and federal courts are the final interpreters of their respective
constitutions, to be sure, but it is no more constitutionally impermissible for
federal courts to borrow state doctrine than it is for state courts to rely on
federal doctrine. It is also true that state constitutions differ from the federal
document. But that is not enough either, unless one thinks that all
comparativism is illegitimate, or that it is inappropriate for state courts to
borrow federal doctrine, as they almost universally do. Of course, neither
system should automatically and uncritically adopt the holdings of the
other,12 but that is not the same as looking—in either direction—for
persuasive authority. After all, if the Justices are comfortable citing
international sources13 and even law reviews, why not also take an
intranational comparative approach by drawing from sources and judges
who are part of the same constitutional system?
8. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Counting States, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 17 (2009)
(“The United States Supreme Court frequently bases federal constitutional doctrine on state law, often
doing so by counting states’ laws in a variety of doctrinal contexts to determine the legislative
consensus among the States.”).
9. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989). See also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,
370 (1989) (“First among the objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction
are statutes passed by society’s elected representatives.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987))).
10. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
11. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
12. See supra note 4 (criticizing the lockstep approach).
13. See generally David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law, 49 UCLA L.
REV. 539 (2001) (surveying the practice of comparative constitutionalism and suggesting a model for
its proper use); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J.
1225 (1999) (similar).
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This Article represents a first effort to consider systematically the
costs and benefits of using state constitutional doctrine to address problems
arising under the federal Constitution. Although it is impossible (and
unnecessary) to say that the approach will be useful or appropriate in all
cases, the basic thesis of the Article is that federal judges confronted with
federal constitutional controversies can and should draw more on the
expertise of state courts that have addressed parallel controversies under
their own constitutions. The aim is to describe an interpretive tool that is
both normatively desirable, in that it is consistent with shared conceptions
about constitutional interpretation and federalism, and practically useful, in
that it is realistic about the differences between state and federal
constitutions and the relative and relevant competencies of state and federal
courts. The structure of the Article reflects this dual descriptive-normative
goal. It begins with a description of current practice, identifies and
evaluates reasons that might explain that practice, measures the thesis
against past cases, and suggests how it might be used in the future.
Part II provides a brief overview of the content and interpretation of
state constitutions. Although state constitutions are far more prolix than
their federal counterpart, they overlap to a considerable degree with it and
with one another—an unsurprising fact once one considers that the federal
Constitution was patterned on state constitutions14 and that subsequent state
constitutional provisions have adopted (sometimes directly) the language of
the federal Constitution. That, in any event, is the conclusion that drives the
major schools of state constitutional interpretation, all of which focus on
the degree to which state supreme courts should or should not adopt federal
constitutional law as their own. But despite state courts’ heavy reliance on
the Supreme Court’s construction of parallel federal provisions, there has
been no corresponding call for the Court to look to state constitutional law
for illumination of federal problems.
Part III describes a simple thesis—that state constitutional doctrine
should more often be used as persuasive authority in federal constitutional
cases—and tests some arguments for and against it. Whereas incorporation
means applying federal constitutional standards against the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, this type of “reverse incorporation”15 would
mean applying state constitutional law against the federal government (and,
14. DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 97 (1998).
15. I do not mean to suggest any formal reliance on the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment–based
incorporation jurisprudence, or on the “reverse incorporation” effectuated in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 500 (1954). The approach I describe could just as accurately be called “intranational
borrowing” or “comparative judicial federalism.”
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by extension, the rest of the states, so long as the right at issue has been
incorporated) through the mechanism of persuasive authority or
constitutional borrowing. Part III.A considers some arguments in favor of
the practice, including respect for the political values of federalism, use of
the experience and expertise of state courts as laboratories for
constitutional innovation, reliance on a more “objective” measure of
current constitutional values, and other general benefits of constitutional
comparativism. But reliance on state constitutional law is not without its
drawbacks, and Part III.B considers some of the arguments against it.
These include the potential for conflict with interpretive approaches like
originalism and textualism, the possibility that state constitutional law is
simply too different, weak, or “political” to be a useful comparator, and the
practical difficulty of identifying and utilizing state constitutional law in a
system in which the states differ so much from one another.
In an attempt to synthesize these arguments for and against, Part IV.A
suggests a taxonomy for what kinds of cases lend themselves to borrowing
state constitutional law. The normative desirability of the thesis, in other
words, varies not only according to one’s preferred interpretive
methodology, but also with regard to the constitutional controversy at
issue. In some areas, state law may simply serve as persuasive authority; in
others, state constitutions have (or should have) a much stronger role.16
Part IV also demonstrates that the thesis has, in some areas of law,
been descriptively accurate. First, the Supreme Court has looked to state
constitutional law for guidance in criminal procedure cases, particularly
with regard to the exclusionary rule and the right to counsel. Second, the
Court has done so in its due process cases, by using state constitutional law
to identify rights that should be considered “fundamental” and thus
protected by the federal Due Process Clause or incorporated against the rest
of the states through that same clause. Finally, in Eighth Amendment cases
the Court has relied heavily on state law, some of it constitutional, as
evidence of “evolving standards of decency.”17 The first example involves
the persuasive authority of state constitutional law; the second and third
examples are much closer to a mandatory reverse incorporation model that
uses state law not simply to influence federal doctrine, but to define it.
16. I elaborate on this argument and address other underlying normative concerns in Joseph
Blocher, What State Constitutional Law Can Tell Us About the Federal Constitution, 114 PENN. ST. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2011).
17. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313–17, 339–40 (2002); Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989).
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Part IV concludes by considering McDonald v. City of Chicago,18 the
most recent case involving an issue on which state constitutional law was
well developed and federal constitutional law nonexistent: the appropriate
standard of review by which to evaluate gun control. McDonald is a
particularly interesting case study because the right it involved—the
“individual” right to keep and bear arms—was constitutionally protected at
the state level long before District of Columbia v. Heller19 (which itself
cited state law20) declared it to be protected by the Second Amendment as
well.21 Thus, the McDonald court was faced with the prospect of
incorporating against the states a right that they already recognized, a fact
the Court noted in declaring the right “fundamental” and thus subject to
incorporation. But in doing so, the Court declined to adopt the
constitutional doctrine that the states had unanimously embraced, one
allowing for “reasonable” regulations of firearms.22 The thesis of this
Article suggests that if the Court looks to state constitutions to determine
the existence of a fundamental, individual right to keep and bear arms, then
it should also look to state constitutional law to define the contours of that
right.
II. STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION
This part gives an overview of the terrain, first describing the history
and content of state constitutions and then briefly laying out some of the
major issues in state constitutional interpretation.
A. STATE CONSTITUTIONS
State constitutions are in a very real sense the root of American
constitutionalism.23 In fact, “State Constitutions are the oldest things in the
18. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
19. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
20. See id. at 580 n.6, 583 n.7, 584–85, 590 n.13, 591, 600–04, 612–14, 629. See also id. at 640–
42, 648 n.10, 651 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21. See Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 191, 192, 206–07 tbl.1 (2006) (noting that forty-four states recognize an individual right to bear
arms).
22. See Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 687 (2007)
(“Under the standard uniformly applied by the states, any law that is a ‘reasonable regulation’ of the
arms right is constitutionally permissible.”).
23. See Randy J. Holland, State Constitutions: Purpose and Function, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 989,
989 (1996) (“State charters are the foundation of American Constitutional law.”). See generally Gordon
S. Wood, Foreword, State Constitution-Making in the American Revolution, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 911
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political history of America, for they are continuations and representatives
of the royal colonial charters, whereby the earliest English settlements in
America were created.”24 By 1783—four years before the federal
Constitution was sent to them for ratification—all but one of the thenexisting states had formally adopted written constitutions, the majority of
which included specific declarations of rights.25 These state constitutions
not only predated their federal counterpart, but also inspired its structure
and some of its most recognizable features.26
The existence of these state constitutional guarantees shaped the
ratification debates, particularly the debate about the need for (and possible
content of) a federal bill of rights. The fact that the federal Constitution
omitted a declaration of rights when it was submitted to the states “stood in
sharp contrast to the state constitutions . . . virtually all of which contained
explicit provisions” to that effect.27 The Federalists and Antifederalists
drew opposite conclusions from that contrast. The Federalists argued,
among other things, that political safeguards were sufficient to protect
individual rights and that the states’ bills of rights were not worthy of
emulation.28 The Antifederalists responded that the federal government
should hold itself to the same limitations as the states did themselves.29
When the Federalists eventually gave in and drafted a federal bill of rights,
they looked to the states’ bills of rights as a model.30 Thus, “Far from being
(1993) (discussing the role of state constitutions in establishing “the primary conceptions of America’s
political and constitutional culture”).
24. Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195,
1199 (1985) (quoting 1 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 413 (2d rev. ed. 1891)). See
also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3066 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“After
declaring their independence, the newly formed States replaced their colonial charters with constitutions
and state bills of rights, almost all of which guaranteed the same fundamental rights that the former
colonists previously had claimed by virtue of their English heritage.”).
25. Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L.
REV. 379, 381 (1980).
26. LUTZ, supra note 14, at 97.
27. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 137 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
28. James Madison, for example, clearly considered the state protections problematic:
[S]ome States have no bills of rights [four states had none], there are others provided with
very defective ones, and there are others whose bills of rights are not only defective, but
absolutely improper; instead of securing some in the full extent which republican principles
would require, they limit them too much to agree with the common ideas of liberty.
Brennan, The Bill of Rights, supra note 6, at 763 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 456 (1789) (Joseph
Gales ed., 1834)).
29. See, e.g., Roger Sherman, A Countryman, II., in ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 218, 219–20 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892).
30. Holland, supra note 23, at 997 (“In fact, state Declarations of Rights were the primary origin
and model for the provisions set forth in the Federal Bill of Rights.”). See also LEONARD W. LEVY,
ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1–11 (1999); Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 6, at 501
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the model for the states, the Federal Bill of Rights was added to the
Constitution to meet demands for the same guarantees against the new
central government that people had secured against their own local
officials.”31 As Justice Brennan would later note, “Prior to the adoption of
the federal Constitution, each of the rights eventually recognized in the
federal Bill of Rights had previously been protected in one or more state
constitutions.”32
James Gardner explains that “state constitutions were originally
intended to be the primary vehicles for protecting the liberties of
Americans, not the supplementary charters they have in many ways
become.”33 And despite the addition of the federal Bill of Rights, state
constitutions remained the primary guarantors of individual rights
throughout most of American history.34 Over time, however, the federal
Constitution displaced state constitutions as the most important source of
individual rights. There are many reasons for this, but certainly much of the
blame must lie with the states, which trampled rights their constitutions
nominally guaranteed, and with the state judges who acquiesced.35 The
(explaining that state court decisions in the 1960s and 1970s “put[] to rest the notion that state
constitutional provisions were adopted to mirror the federal Bill of Rights. The lesson of history is
otherwise; indeed, the drafters of the federal Bill of Rights drew upon corresponding provisions in the
various state constitutions”); Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63
TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1081 (1985) (noting that the federal Framers “derived much of their inspiration
from guarantees provided by the colonies that became the original states”).
31. Linde, supra note 25, at 381. See also People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113 (Cal. 1975)
(“It is a fiction too long accepted that provisions in state constitutions textually identical to the Bill of
Rights were intended to mirror their federal counterpart. The lesson of history is otherwise: the Bill of
Rights was based upon the corresponding provisions of the first state constitutions, rather than the
reverse.”).
32. Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 6, at 501 (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of
Rights and the States, in THE GREAT RIGHTS (Edmond Cahn ed., 1963)). See also Stewart G. Pollock,
Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and
Federal Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977, 979 (1985) (“Before the enactment of the first ten amendments to
the United States Constitution, fundamental liberties such as freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures were protected by state constitutions.”).
33. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761,
773 (1992).
34. Robert K. Fitzpatrick, Note, Neither Icarus nor Ostrich: State Constitutions as an
Independent Source of Individual Rights, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1833, 1836 (2004) (“As James Madison
suggested during the ratification debates, for the first 175 years after the adoption of the federal
Constitution, state constitutions were the primary guarantors of individual rights.” (footnote omitted)).
35. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution of Equality in State Constitutional Law, 34
RUTGERS L.J. 1013, 1018 (2003) (“[F]or a long period of time state equality guarantees lay relatively
dormant, ignored by state courts or enervated by them of their potential vitality.”). See generally
ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975) (exploring
the role of antebellum judges in applying the law of slavery). But see Williams, supra note 24, at 1203
(“State constitutional equality provisions played a minor but important part in the overall process of
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Civil War and Reconstruction, of course, inaugurated a sea change from a
state-based protection of individual rights toward one that was federally
centered.36 The Fourteenth Amendment’s declaration that all citizens of the
states were also citizens of the United States, subject to the protections of
its laws and Constitution,37 laid the textual foundation for this move.
As a doctrinal matter, the state-to-federal shift put into motion by the
Fourteenth Amendment stumbled at first,38 but became a constitutional
reality in the twentieth century through the Court’s “incorporation”
jurisprudence. That doctrine has bound the states to almost all of the
guarantees in the federal Bill of Rights—the same list of rights that was
inspired by state constitutions two centuries ago. Incorporation, however,
does not require state courts to interpret their own constitutions in lockstep
with the federal document. A state court can interpret its state’s free speech
right as being more or less expansive than the First Amendment, for
example, even if the two are identically worded and even though the state
itself cannot violate the federal standard.39
State courts’ efforts to craft a distinct and useful state constitutional
doctrine in the shadow of the federal document are discussed in more detail
in the following section. Suffice it to say their task has been eased
somewhat by the fact that state constitutions echo one another and the
federal Constitution.40 Whether because they have copied the federal
document or because it copied them, most state constitutions today contain
rights guarantees that are either identical or substantially similar to those
found in the federal charter. Every state has a bill of rights,41 and almost all
of them reproduce in some form or another the full list of rights protected
eliminating slavery and segregation.”).
36. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3028 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“The
constitutional Amendments adopted in the aftermath of the Civil War fundamentally altered our
country’s federal system.”).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
38. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 37 (1873) (interpreting the Privileges or
Immunities Clause narrowly).
39. Barry Latzer, Four Half-Truths About State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1123,
1127 (1992) (“[N]othing in federal constitutional law prevents state courts from interpreting state law
more narrowly than federal, despite the fact that they are barred [by the Supremacy Clause] from
enforcing the less-protective state law.”).
40. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 50–55 (1998) (noting that state
constitutions have borrowed extensively from one another); James A. Gardner, State Constitutional
Rights as Resistance to National Power: Toward a Functional Theory of State Constitutions, 91 GEO.
L.J. 1003, 1029 (2003) (“[T]he texts of the state constitutions are, at many critical points, similar or
even identical to one another and to parallel provisions of the U.S. Constitution.”).
41. Gardner, supra note 40, at 1015.
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by the federal Bill of Rights.42 “For example, the constitutions of thirty-two
states contain due process clauses identical to the Due Process Clauses of
the . . . U.S. Constitution” and “[t]he constitutions of thirty-seven states
contain language identical to the Speedy Trial Clause of the federal Sixth
Amendment.”43 All but one state specifically protect the right to free
speech, and each protects the rights to freedom of religion, to a jury trial,
and from unreasonable searches and seizures.44
Although they cover the same ground as the federal Bill of Rights,
nearly all state constitutions also go much further in terms of the rights they
protect. Many guarantee “positive” rights—obligations on the government
to provide public education, for example45—which are unheard of in the
federal system.46 But perhaps the most striking (and arguably most
important) aspect of state constitutions is not their substantive content, but
the ease with which they can be amended, and the corresponding frequency
with which they are.47 As discussed in more detail in Part III.B.2, this
feature has important implications for state constitutionalism and its
relationship with federal constitutional law.
B. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Just as the language of federal and state constitutions has been closely
42. Robert Force, State “Bills of Rights”: A Case of Neglect and the Need for a Renaissance, 3
VAL. U. L. REV. 125 app. at 165–82 (1969) (comparing state bills of rights provisions to guarantees in
the federal Bill of Rights and finding substantial similarities). See also id. at 138 (“Every state provides
for the protection of some or all of the rights usually referred to as First Amendment rights. All states,
with varying degrees of generality or specificity, guarantee the free exercise of religion and freedom of
the press.”); id. at 139 (“The Second and Third Amendments are also well represented in the
states . . . . The Fourth Amendment search and seizure warrant provisions are present in some degree in
every state . . . .”); id. at 140 (“With the exception of the requirement of indictment by grand jury, all of
the Fifth Amendment rights are well represented . . . . Almost all Sixth Amendment rights are also
present in most of the states.”); id. at 140–41 (reaching a similar conclusion with regard to the Seventh
and Eighth Amendments).
43. Gardner, supra note 40, at 1029.
44. Id. at 1028. Delaware is the outlier, lacking an explicit provision protecting freedom of
speech. Id. at 1028 n.118.
45. A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court,
62 VA. L. REV. 873, 917 (1976) (“Today forty-two state constitutions direct the legislature to establish a
system of schools.”); Paul W. Kahn, State Constitutionalism and the Problems of Fairness, 30 VAL. U.
L. REV. 459, 466 n.27 (1996) (“Every state constitution, except that of Mississippi, includes an
education clause, requiring provision of free public education.”). See also Allen W. Hubsch, The
Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325, 1335–42 (1992)
(discussing state constitutional educational rights).
46. See Helen Hershkoff, “Just Words”: Common Law and the Enforcement of State
Constitutional Social and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1533–34 (2010).
47. See infra notes 174–77 and accompanying text.
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related since the Founding, so too has the interpretation of those
constitutions by federal and state judges. To take just one fundamental but
often overlooked example, judicial review—sometimes characterized as the
most important proposition in American constitutional law48—was a state
constitutional principle before John Marshall embraced it in Marbury v.
Madison.49 As Jeff Powell notes, “Only the eclipse of state constitutional
law has led to Marbury’s enthronement as the case that ‘established’
judicial review.”50 That eclipse has been lengthy and almost total. Despite
their formal interpretive independence, state courts have generally followed
the Supreme Court’s lead, adopting its tests and doctrines as their own.
Thus, the first question for state constitutional interpretation is an
existential one: Can and should it be an enterprise independent from the
Supreme Court’s exposition of the federal Constitution?
As a doctrinal matter, the most important starting point is the fact that
state courts have final authority in construing state charters, just as the
Supreme Court bears ultimate power over the federal Constitution.51 This
means that there is no legal reason why state courts must construe their
own cases in “lockstep” with federal doctrine, even when the terms of the
rights guarantees are identical.52 As a result, state courts can accord
protection to state constitutional rights that differs from the protection
given by federal courts to analogous federal rights. In practice, of course,
state protections that fall below the federal floor are unlikely ever to be
invoked, since states may not violate those federal rights that have been
incorporated against them. But where states accord more protection than
the Court has given for analogous federal rights, the federal floor might
become irrelevant.53
48. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 39 (3d
ed. 2006) (“Marbury v. Madison is the single most important decision in American constitutional
law.”).
49. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See Howard, supra note 45, at 877
(“[L]ong before Chief Justice John Marshall decided Marbury v. Madison, state courts had begun
fashioning the doctrine of judicial review.”).
50. H. Jefferson Powell, The Uses of State Constitutional History: A Case Note, 53 ALB. L. REV.
283, 294 (1989).
51. See, e.g., Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 120–21 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(providing examples of state supreme court decisions interpreting state constitutions to protect
individual rights); Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New Judicial
Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 100 (2000) (“[S]tate supreme courts have the unquestioned,
final authority to interpret their state constitutions.”).
52. See Gardner, supra note 40, at 1030.
53. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988) (“Individual states may surely construe
their own constitutions as imposing more stringent constraints on police conduct than does the Federal
Constitution.”); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013–14 (1983) (“It is elementary that States are
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With that basic interpretive fact in mind, it is somewhat less surprising
that throughout much of American history, state constitutional
interpretation was the most important game in town. When the Court (per
Chief Justice Marshall) held in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore54 that states
were not beholden to the federal Bill of Rights, the only “individual rights”
provisions they were bound to respect were those found in their own
constitutions. Moreover, at least until the 1930s, state statutes and common
law were more important than their federal equivalents. In the 1970s,
Justice Brennan reminisced that in the “days of innocence” of his early law
practice, “the preoccupation of the profession, bench and bar, was with
questions usually answered by application of state common law principles
or state statutes.”55
Of course, the preeminence of state law changed in part due to the
New Deal,56 as the reach of federal law grew in ways that would have been
unimaginable decades earlier. But in the decades following this expansion
of federal statutory law (and the “structural” constitutional law necessary to
justify and sustain it57), an even more serious challenge to the centrality of
state constitutional law would emerge. This was the Supreme Court’s
“incorporation” doctrine, which applied the guarantees of the federal Bill of
Rights to the states. The process of incorporation began slowly in the
1930s, but accelerated throughout the 1960s under the Warren Court.58
This expansion of federal rights was doubtless due in part to state courts’
apparent inability or unwillingness to effectuate the rights guaranteed by
their own constitutions.59
free to provide greater protections in their criminal justice system than the Federal Constitution
requires.”); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (noting that each state has a
“sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those
conferred by the Federal Constitution”).
54. Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833).
55. Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 6, at 489.
56. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 42–44 (1991) (“[T]he 1930’s
mark the definitive constitutional triumph of activist national government.”).
57. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
58. Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 6, at 493 (“It was in the years from 1962 to 1969
that the face of the law changed.”).
59. See Linde, supra note 5, at 174; David Schuman, A Failed Critique of State
Constitutionalism, 91 MICH. L. REV. 274, 280 (1992) (arguing that incorporation doctrine “resulted
from the unwillingness of many state courts, particularly in the South, to use their own constitutions to
protect their citizens from state overreaching”). For a contemporary observation on the issue, see
Monrad G. Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts and First Amendment Freedoms, 4 VAND. L. REV.
620, 642 (1951) (“Although state constitutions contain full statements of our civil liberties, . . . . [o]nly
occasionally do state cases concerned with freedom of press, speech, assembly and worship take a
position protecting the freedoms beyond what has been required by the United States Supreme Court.”).
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Incorporation, combined with the Warren Court’s expansive reading
of the federal rights that were being incorporated, effectively sidelined state
constitutional law.60 States could continue to read their constitutions
however they pleased—many had already recognized the rights that were
being incorporated against them61—but the Supremacy Clause required
them to treat the federal guarantees as a “floor” beneath which state rights
could not fall. As a result, state constitutional law emerged as an
independent legal force only where it exceeded the federal floor.62 And
since relatively few state courts were inclined to read rights more broadly
than the Warren Court, the Federal Reporter effectively displaced state
constitutions.63 Any litigant with a modicum of litigation savvy knew to put
federal claims front and center, meaning that state court decisions were
increasingly ignored by litigants64 and scholars65 alike. And many state
courts, knowing that federal rights were so expansive, tended to resolve
cases on the basis of federal guarantees rather than state analogues. The
result was an atrophying of state constitutional interpretation.
60. Charles G. Douglas, III, State Judicial Activism—The New Role for State Bills of Rights, 12
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1123, 1140 (1978) (“The federalization of all our rights has led to a rapid withering
of the development of state decisions based upon state constitutional provisions.”); Gardner, supra note
33, at 805 (“By far the most widely accepted explanation for the poverty of contemporary state
constitutional law holds that it was marginalized by the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation
doctrine.”); James A. Gardner & Jim Rossi, Foreword, The New Frontier of State Constitutional Law,
46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1231, 1232–33 (2005) (noting that after the Warren Court’s expansive
reading of individual rights, “state constitutional law was seen, not illogically, as in some fundamental
way subordinate to national constitutional law”).
61. Linde, supra note 25, at 382 (“[T]he states had all these guarantees in their own laws long
before the Federal Bill of Rights was applied to the states. State courts had been administering these
laws, sometimes generously, more often not, for a century or more without awaiting an interpretation
from the United States Supreme Court.”).
62. See Robin B. Johansen, Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of
the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 297, 297 (1977) (“Because United States Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the Bill of Rights and the 14th amendment mark the minimum guarantees of
individual rights, state courts that give truly independent force to their own constitutions generally reach
decisions more protective of those rights than the Supreme Court.”).
63. Force, supra note 42, at 125 (suggesting, partly in jest, “The state Bills of Rights have been
superseded. No one pays any attention to them anymore; lawyers don’t even cite them in their briefs
now. A state constitution should be streamlined. The Bill of Rights has to go!”).
64. Linde, supra note 25, at 391 (“A generation of lawyers brought up on United States Supreme
Court opinions seems literally speechless when we ask from the bench, as we sometimes do, how we
should decide a constitutional question if the Supreme Court has never addressed it.”); Paulsen, supra
note 59, at 620 (“State court decisions and state constitutional materials are too frequently ignored by
both commentator and counsel when civil liberties questions arise.”).
65. Hans A. Linde, State Constitutions Are Not Common Law: Comments on Gardner’s Failed
Discourse, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 927, 936 (1993) (decrying the “ingrained assumption[]” that “attention to
the constitutional law of a state . . . is for ambitious professors and law review editors a distinctly minor
league game”).
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But if state constitutional interpretation was submerged when the
Warren Court’s tide rolled in, it was uncovered again when that tide rolled
back out. As belief spread that the Burger Court would not read individual
rights guarantees as expansively as its predecessor, state constitutional
guarantees ceased being irrelevant—the federal floor had receded, and it
was now possible that a state constitutional claim might succeed where its
federal analogue would fail. Liberals saw their opportunity.66 Led by
Justice Brennan—who called them to arms both in his opinions (usually
dissents67) and in articles and speeches—liberals urged state courts to “step
into the breach” left by the Burger Court’s “contraction of federal rights
and remedies on grounds of federalism.”68 The “Magna Carta” of this new
movement in state constitutional interpretation was Justice Brennan’s 1977
Harvard Law Review article, “State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights,”69 in which he called on state courts to reclaim ground
the Burger Court had allegedly given away.70 Brennan undoubtedly saw
66. It seems to be relatively well accepted that the push for expanded state constitutionalism was
a liberal phenomenon. Kahn, supra note 45, at 464 (“State constitutionalism represented a kind of
forum shopping for liberals.”); Johansen, supra note 62, at 299 (“Writers on both sides of the
independent interpretation debate suggest that state courts are turning to their own constitutions
primarily because they disagree with the growing ‘conservatism’ of the Burger Court.”); Earl M. Maltz,
The Political Dynamic of the “New Judicial Federalism,” 2 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 233, 235
(1989) (“[T]he revival of interest in state constitutionalism is generally conceded to be a reaction to the
Burger Court’s perceived hostility to Warren Court activism and its extension.”).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 454–55 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Paul
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 735 n.18 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96,
120 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“In light of today’s erosion of Miranda standards as a matter of
federal constitutional law, it is appropriate to observe that no State is precluded by the decision from
adhering to higher standards under state law.”).
68. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions
as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548 (1986). See also Brennan Lauds State
Courts for Taking Lead in Defending Rights, 18 CRIM. JUST. NEWSL., May 1, 1987, at 5. Similar voices
were heard even before Warren E. Burger became Chief Justice. See, e.g., Force, supra note 42, at 126
(“[S]tates in the past have played an important, although far from ideal, role in the protection of
individual rights and must be prepared to play an even more important role in the future.”). Justice
Brennan himself had been emphasizing these issues for years, and already in 1961 had written of the
importance of state guarantees of individual rights beyond the “incorporation” doctrine, and encouraged
judicial intervention and a larger role for state courts in enforcing state bills of rights. Brennan, The Bill
of Rights, supra note 6, at 777–78.
69. Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 6.
70. Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35
RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 716 (1983) (describing Brennan’s article as the “Magna Carta of state
constitutional law”). See also Friedman, supra note 51, at 93 (claiming that “[t]he story of the modern
state constitutionalism movement begins with [Brennan’s article]”); Gardner, supra note 40, at 1031
(concluding that the “present era in state constitutional jurisprudence can be traced” to Brennan’s
article); Kahn, supra note 45, at 459 n.2 (referring to Brennan’s article as “the starting point of a new
scholarly attention to state constitutionalism”). Hans A. Linde, however, concludes that
“[c]ontemporary discussion in the law reviews began . . . in 1969.” Linde, supra note 5, at 175 (citing
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this as a way to expand individual rights,71 and for good reason: state
constitutional doctrine will almost inevitably have a rights-expanding
effect, since—at least for state constitutional rights whose federal
analogues have been incorporated—state constitutional law will be
irrelevant wherever it falls below the federal floor, but can always build on
that floor.72 Even so, the desire for a more robust system of state
constitutional interpretation was not, and is not, confined to liberals. Many
supported—and continue to support—the importance of state constitutional
law on grounds that are not so outcome oriented, or which focus on
principles like federalism.73 Chief Justice Burger, for example,
occasionally gestured toward an expanded role for state courts.74
The degree to which state courts have answered the call to action
remains debatable. Paul Kahn writes that “[a]s much as any judicial
opinion [Brennan] ever wrote, this plea has influenced the development of
American constitutionalism.”75 This is certainly true in some sense: many
state courts gave broader protection to state constitutional rights than the
Burger Court did for those rights’ federal analogues.76 This was most
notable in the area of criminal procedure, where the Burger Court was
perceived as being especially rights restrictive and some state courts
responded by expanding state-level protections.77
Force, supra note 42).
71. Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet—Justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional Law,
15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429, 432 (1988) (criticizing Brennan’s outcome-oriented vision of state
constitutional law).
72. Id. at 433 (concluding that it is “virtually guarantee[d] that state court activism” primarily
will favor liberal causes and have a liberal effect because state courts have to respect the floor set by
federal rights guarantees).
73. See, e.g., Randall T. Shepard, The Maturing Nature of State Constitution Jurisprudence, 30
VAL. U. L. REV. 421, 421 (1996) (“[T]he continuing strength of this movement does not derive from a
desire to continue, at the state level, the agenda of the Warren-Brennan Court. It derives from the
aspiration of state court judges to be independent sources of law.”).
74. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 440 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(“For all we know, the state courts would find this statute invalid under the State Constitution, but no
one on either side of the case thought to discuss this or exhibit any interest in the subject.”).
75. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1147, 1147 (1993).
76. TARR, supra note 40, at 165–66 (finding that between 1950 and 1969, state courts relied on
state constitutions to afford greater protection than the federal Constitution in only ten cases, but that
they did so in more than three hundred cases between 1970 and 1986); Brennan, supra note 68, at 549
(“[S]tate courts have responded with marvelous enthusiasm to many not-so-subtle invitations to fill the
constitutional gaps left by the decisions of the Supreme Court majority.”); James N.G. Cauthen,
Expanding Rights Under State Constitutions: A Quantitative Appraisal, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1183, 1201–02
(2000) (concluding that state supreme courts have, in hundreds of cases, interpreted state constitutions
to provide more protection for individual liberties than similar provisions of the federal Constitution).
77. See Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 KY. L.J.
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On the other hand, either from force of habit, mistaken belief that they
were bound by the federal rules, lack of expertise, or simply because they
agreed with the Burger Court’s reasoning, most state courts continued to
apply their own constitutional provisions in lockstep with federal
analogues.78 To this day, most state courts adopt federal constitutional law
as their own.79 Bowing to the nationalization of constitutional discourse,
they “tend to follow whatever doctrinal vocabulary is used by the United
States Supreme Court, discussed in the law reviews, and taught in the law
schools.”80
As state courts struggled with the questions of when, why, and how to
follow or diverge from federal doctrine, the debate launched by Justice
Brennan in the pages of the Harvard Law Review began to fill other law
journals with scholarly treatment of what many called the “New Judicial
Federalism.” That scholarship did not—and still has not81—come
anywhere near rivaling the attention lavished on the federal Constitution,
but after decades in the wilderness its appearance in polite society has
nonetheless been startling. The literature is too varied to summarize easily,
but it is fair to say that the major question it seeks to answer is whether
state courts should follow federal constitutional law when addressing state
constitutional questions.
At least three major schools of thought have emerged—all of them
useful both as descriptions of state courts’ actual behavior and as normative
accounts of what that behavior should be. The first is known as the primacy
873, 873–75 (1975); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court
Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY. L.J. 421, 425–26 (1974).
78. Gardner & Rossi, supra note 60, at 1233 (“[S]tate courts often acted as though they need not
bother to look any further than the shared national principles embodied in the U.S. Constitution.”).
79. Craig F. Emmert & Carol Ann Traut, State Supreme Courts, State Constitutions, and Judicial
Policymaking, 16 JUST. SYS. J. 37, 47 (1992) (concluding “that much constitutional policymaking by
state supreme courts involves application of national judicial policy to the states”); Fitzpatrick, supra
note 34, at 1850 (“Despite . . . criticism, the lockstep approach remains the most common approach to
state constitutionalism.”); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Federalism, Liberty and State
Constitutional Law, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1457, 1467 (1997) (“Despite the considerable hoopla
afforded a few decisions from a few states, the vast majority of state courts follow federal law when
construing the liberty-protecting provisions of their own constitutions . . . .”).
80. Linde, supra note 5, at 186.
81. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1105 n.228 (1981) (“[D]espite the increasing
activism of some courts, the state judiciary remains at the periphery of the scholars’ vision.”); Jennifer
Friesen, Adventures in Federalism: Some Observations on the Overlapping Spheres of State and
Federal Constitutional Law, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 25, 32 (1993) (“It is past the hour when state
constitutional law should lose the glamour of innovation and become part of the standardized
curriculum.”).
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approach, and is associated with law professor and former justice of the
Oregon Supreme Court Hans Linde. Under this approach, state courts faced
with state and federal constitutional claims should resolve the former first,
thereby encouraging the growth of an independent and relevant body of
state constitutional law.82 The second approach is called the criteria (or
interstitial83) approach, under which “state courts assume ‘the dominance
of federal law and focus directly on the gap-filling potential of state
constitutions.’”84 Under this approach, federal constitutional law plays the
lead role, with state constitutional law emerging only in certain predefined
circumstances or where gaps remain to be filled. The third method is
known somewhat derogatively as the lockstep approach, under which state
courts interpret their constitutional provisions as having the same meaning
as their federal analogues.85 This final approach is perhaps the most
accurate descriptively,86 but it is nonetheless widely reviled by scholars of
state constitutional law. Overlaying the discussions of these three
approaches to state constitutional interpretation, as well as various
permutations and iterations thereof, are sharply divergent views about
whether a robust state constitutionalism is desirable, or even possible.87
The purpose of this Article is not to resolve, nor even thoroughly to
explore, the debate about how state courts should interpret their own
constitutions, but rather to focus on if and how federal courts should rely
on those interpretations. For that debate, the relevant point is that a major—
and perhaps primary—question for state constitutional law has been the
degree to which state courts should rely on federal constitutional doctrine
when interpreting parallel provisions of state constitutions. And yet there
has been no corresponding call for federal courts to learn from the state
82. See Linde, supra note 5, at 178 (“My own view has long been that a state court always is
responsible for the law of its state before deciding whether the state falls short of a national standard, so
that no federal issue is properly reached when the state’s law protects the claimed right.”); Hans A.
Linde, Without “Due Process”: Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125, 135 (1970)
(“Claims raised under the state constitution should always be dealt with and disposed of before reaching
a fourteenth amendment claim of deprivation of due process or equal protection.” (emphasis omitted)).
83. Gardner, supra note 33, at 774–75. Justin Long describes a similar approach he calls
“intermittent” state constitutionalism. See Justin Long, Intermittent State Constitutionalism, 34 PEPP. L.
REV. 41, 48–50 (2006).
84. Friedman, supra note 51, at 104 (quoting Developments in the Law—The Interpretation of
State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1357 (1982)).
85. Id. at 102 (“Under the lockstep approach, the state constitutional analysis begins and ends
with consideration of the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the textual provision at issue.”).
86. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 33, at 823–32 (presenting practical and normative arguments
against robust state constitutionalism); Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its
Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REV. 271, 286–300 (1998) (similar).
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courts, despite the fact that many of the benefits of constitutional
borrowing would presumably flow in that direction as well. The following
part considers why this asymmetry exists and whether it is justified.
III. USING STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
The overall project of this Article is to consider whether state
constitutional law is, can be, and perhaps should be a useful tool for federal
constitutional interpretation. Rather than suggesting a single overarching
answer to that question, this part aims to consider the weighty arguments
for and against such a practice.
By cataloguing positives and negatives, I do not mean to suggest that
determining the appropriateness of borrowing state constitutional law is a
simple matter of counting up hash marks and finding, for example, three
convincing arguments in favor and only two against. Undoubtedly some
arguments are more important than others. Nor by listing arguments do I
mean to indicate that there are no deeper threads connecting them. To the
contrary, separating the arguments is important precisely because it makes
it easier to tease out those threads.
Moreover, identifying the separate arguments helps demonstrate how
the use of state constitutional law as an interpretive aid fits more
comfortably with some theories of federal constitutional interpretation than
it does with others. For example, use of state constitutional law may be
particularly germane for those who believe in “pragmatic” adjudication,88
since it provides a systematic way to take into account such practical
matters as the experience and wisdom of state courts, and to a lesser degree
the contemporary constitutional values of the people as a whole. For the
same reasons, applying state constitutional law as an interpretive tool may
be attractive to those who believe that there is a moral and ethical
component to constitutional interpretation,89 or that constitutional law can
88. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
16 (2005); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 385 (2003) (“[P]ragmatic
analyses are connected by their common origin in an unillusioned conception of the character, motives,
and competence of the participants in the governmental process, whether judges, politicians, other
officials, or ordinary voters.”).
89. See Lawrence G. Sager, Cool Federalism and the Life-Cycle of Moral Progress, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1385, 1391–97 (2005) (describing the system by which states’ moral experimentation
should be allowed and encouraged, with the federal government imposing uniformity only after
principles have become generally accepted).
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and should be shaped by popular values.90 And for those who seek to
interpret the Constitution in light of the “structure” it creates91—respect for
the states being one of the most important incidents of that structure—
relying on states’ interpretations of parallel constitutional provisions is a
powerful way to respect not just the states’ political branches, but their
courts as well.
A. ARGUMENTS FOR
For simplicity’s sake, the discussion here focuses on three potential
benefits of using state constitutional law as persuasive authority:
federalism, measuring contemporary constitutional values, and
comparativism.
1. Federalism
It has often been said that the hallmark of American constitutionalism
is the division of power between the federal government and the states.92
State constitutional law has an important and arguably underappreciated
role to play in this federalist structure.93
a. States as Laboratories
There are many ways to explain and justify our commitment (whether
real or imagined) to federalism. One of the most powerful, however,
derives from Justice Brandeis’s obligatorily quotable observation that “[i]t
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”94 The
90. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 107 (2004) (“In a world of popular constitutionalism, government officials are the
regulated, not the regulators, and final interpretive authority rests with the people themselves.”).
91. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 15
(1969) (“[J]udgment is reached not fundamentally on the basis of that kind of textual exegesis which we
tend to regard as normal, but on the basis of reasoning from the total structure which the text has
created.”).
92. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 869 (2009) (describing the American system as “a
government whose hallmark is supposed to be the separation of powers”); Jonathan Zasloff, The
Tyranny of Madison, 44 UCLA L. REV. 795, 810 (1997) (“The separation of powers serves as the
central hallmark of American constitutional structure.”).
93. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489,
491 (1954) (“Nowhere is the theory and practice of American federalism more significantly revealed
than in the constitutions of the states.”). See also Holland, supra note 23, at 989 (“A knowledge of the
origins and history of state constitutions is essential to understanding federalism in the United States.”).
94. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court often invokes this principle when declining to create a
single binding federal rule for the entire country.95 But states may also have
experience with a constitutional problem before it ever reaches the
Supreme Court. And if the Court is going to respect the role of states as
laboratories, then it would seem that whenever the Court confronts a
federal constitutional problem with a state analogue, it might usefully learn
from the experience of the state courts that got there first. After all, if the
Court defers to states’ laboratories while they work on a constitutional
problem, shouldn’t the Court take into account whatever answer they
reach?
The use of the exclusionary rule, which is discussed in more detail
below,96 provides an interesting and illustrative example. After the
Supreme Court introduced the exclusionary rule in Weeks v. United
States,97 many state courts followed suit under their own constitutional
guarantees. Most influential of these was the California Supreme Court,
which concluded that no other rule sufficed to deter unconstitutional
searches and seizures.98 When, in Mapp v. Ohio,99 the Supreme Court
incorporated the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule against the states,
it did so based largely on California’s experience.100 The Court followed
the California Supreme Court’s conclusion not necessarily out of respect
for state sovereignty, but because the state had hands-on experience with a
specific problem and had, in its role as a laboratory, settled on a solution.
That kind of pragmatic borrowing is different in kind from borrowing
based on respect for federalism as a political value. It is also different from
using the states as some kind of barometer for “moral” or values-based
inquiries, such as the Court arguably does in the due process and Eighth
Amendment contexts.
In other words, state courts need not be independent laboratories.
They can be part of the same general research institution as the Supreme
Court.101 And respect for their work need not always lead the Supreme
95. See, e.g., Oregon v. Ice, 129 S. Ct. 711, 718–19 (2009); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8
(1995); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring);
Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 579–80, 582 (1981); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441, 446
(1980); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50 (1973); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 356, 376 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
96. See infra Part IV.B.1.
97. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391–93 (1914).
98. People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 912–13 (Cal. 1955).
99. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
100. Id. at 651–52.
101. See Kahn, supra note 75, at 1148 (explaining that state courts should be viewed as having
“the authority to put into place, within [each] community, [their] unique interpretation [of a] common
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Court to avoid deciding issues; it can also be a factor in shaping the Court’s
own federal constitutional jurisprudence.102
b. The Political Values of Federalism
There is another federalism-related reason why state constitutional
doctrine can be useful in resolving constitutional disputes: dividing power
between the federal and state governments prevents either of them from
overreaching, and can thereby help protect individual liberty.103
Many theories of federalism emphasize the important role of the
states’ political branches in preserving the federalist structure. The
“political safeguards” theory of federalism, for example, focuses on the
degree to which states can protect their own interests and sovereignty
through political means.104 This view of federalism has, in turn, influenced
the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, perhaps most notably in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,105 in which the Court held that
the Tenth Amendment need not serve as an independent check on
congressional power, since the states can protect themselves through the
political process.
One may be left wondering, however, about the “judicial safeguards”
of federalism. If the sharing of decisionmaking authority protects states and
encourages better decisions in the political branches, it would seem that the
same principle should apply to judicial decisionmaking. The state and
federal judicial branches, after all, are every bit as intertwined as the state
and federal legislatures, and far more so than state and federal executives.
If the essence of federalism is that state actors must be given due respect
within these spheres, then the suggestion that federal courts should consider
borrowing state constitutional doctrine seems, if anything, too modest.
object”).
102. Howard, supra note 45, at 879 (concluding, after reviewing state constitutional law regarding
economic regulation, criminal procedure, religion, education, environment, and “autonomy and
lifestyles,” that “[t]he picture . . . goes far in giving empirical vindication to the textbook portrait of the
states in the Federal Union as vehicles for experimentation, with their achievements and their mistakes
available for others to study”).
103. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 258 (James Madison) (Lawrence Goldman ed., 2008) (“In the
compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two
distinct [state and federal] governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct
and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different
governments will control each other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.”).
104. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 176–
90 (1980); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 558 (1954).
105. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551–54 (1985).
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This is not to suggest that current federal doctrine totally neglects state
courts and state constitutions. But rather than encourage federal courts to
engage directly with state constitutional law, present doctrine tends to
adopt a much more categorical approach, requiring federal courts in certain
situations to respect state law by avoiding it. Abstention principles do this
by requiring federal courts to avoid hearing state court cases or state law
claims.106 Perhaps the most easily recognizable of these is the independent
and adequate state grounds rule, pursuant to which federal courts will
decline to reverse the decision of a state court, even if it is based on an
incorrect interpretation of federal law, so long as there are sufficient
reasons for the decision that are grounded in state law.107
This line-drawing reflects a “dualist” vision of federalism. Under that
view, states and the federal government are sovereign and independent in
their own spheres, and the primary function of federalism jurisprudence is
to maintain the boundary between them.108 As effectuated in the
“federalism revolution” associated with the Rehnquist Court, this often
meant limiting federal power and protecting the power of states.109
Jurisdictional rules that discourage state and federal courts from jointly
addressing common constitutional issues make sense under this dualist
vision because they preserve separate roles for state and federal courts.
Such rules keep them from stepping on each other’s toes by preventing
them from dancing at all.
But many have begun to question whether the dualist vision is
accurate as a descriptive matter or desirable as a normative one. Robert
Schapiro, for example, explores what he calls “polyphonic federalism”110—
106. See, e.g., Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817–21
(1976) (allowing abstention in cases of parallel litigation); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 52–54
(1971) (requiring, with limited exceptions, federal courts to abstain from hearing civil rights tort claims
arising from criminal prosecution until the plaintiff/defendant is convicted); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319
U.S. 315, 333–34 (1943) (allowing federal abstention when state courts have greater expertise in the
matter); R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499–502 (1941) (holding that in most cases
federal courts should not adjudicate the constitutionality of a state law until state courts have had a
reasonable opportunity to do so).
107. See, e.g., Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210 (1935) (describing this as a “settled
rule”).
108. Younger, 401 U.S. at 44 (describing the idea of “Our Federalism” as “the belief that the
National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their
separate functions in their separate ways”).
109. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7, 7–8 (2001)
(describing the Rehnquist Court’s “federalism revolution”); Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s
Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (describing the same development as a “Federalist
Revival”).
110. Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87
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a federalism that “achieves its goals not through the separation of state and
national power, but through their interaction.”111 That approach to
federalism, it turns out, may well be a truer description of current practice
and also a more attractive aspiration. Rather than seeing state and federal
governments as fully independent entities, such theories cast them, in
Gardner’s words, as parts of an “interlocking plan of federalism devised
collectively by the people of the nation and maintained by them as part of a
comprehensive plan designed to serve the overriding national purpose of
protecting the liberty of all Americans.”112
If respecting federalism means more than simply drawing lines
between state and federal court judgments, then abstention-type rules that
quarantine the courts are not ideal. What is needed instead is an approach
under which state and federal courts are not hermetically sealed off from
each other, but rather partners in a shared enterprise of articulating
constitutional values. Federal utilization of state constitutional law has the
potential to do just that. Rather than simply insulating state court decisions
from federal review, it would encourage federal courts to give increased
consideration to state constitutional law, even in federal cases. Although
this would require a more nuanced approach than the current rules of
abstention, it would not be contrary to their general purposes. That is, if
federalism is an adequate justification for requiring federal courts to avoid
disturbing state court judgments, it would seem to follow that federalism
principles might similarly require federal courts to be attuned to general
state court doctrine even in cases governed by federal law. State courts, in
other words, should be able to have a more generalized but less rigid
impact on federal constitutional law—not just displacing it in those areas in
which federal courts defer to state adjudication, but systematically
influencing it whenever state and federal courts face similar constitutional
questions.
State courts appear to be holding up their end of this arrangement
(perhaps with too much enthusiasm) by borrowing heavily from federal
doctrine. Federal courts, on the other hand, generally are not. And if the
vision of federalism as a shared constitutional enterprise is to be effectuated
in doctrine, federal courts should take better account of their cousins.
CALIF. L. REV. 1409, 1411 (1999) (defending “a robust role for federal courts in interpreting state
constitutions”).
111. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 316
(2005).
112. Gardner, supra note 40, at 1005.
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2. An “Objective” Measure of Current Constitutional Values
The relationship between contemporary, popular constitutional values
and constitutional doctrine has long bedeviled Justices and scholars. Some
argue that the former should be irrelevant to the latter,113 others that the two
are intertwined,114 and others that the latter is (and should be) meaningfully
influenced by the former.115
Assuming for the moment that the search for contemporary
constitutional values is a worthy enterprise, at least in some cases, it
nonetheless faces evidentiary obstacles. Article V of the Constitution
provides one way for the people to make their constitutional views heard,
but its requirements are so rigid and cumbersome that formal amendments
are, at best, an extremely rough barometer for current constitutional
values.116 How, then, is one to know what the people think about a
constitutional issue? The Court has no power to “certify” a question to the
American people, and it seems unsatisfactory—base, even—to rely on
polling data. Statutory enactments are a better measure, perhaps, since they
arguably provide a more “objective” indicator of the current will of the
people, as effectuated by their elected officials. And indeed the Court has
often relied on state legislative enactments when charting the bounds of its
due process, Fourth Amendment, and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.117
But even assuming that state legislatures’ views can be tallied (an
assumption the Court frequently makes118), if the Constitution is interpreted
according to state legislative enactments, how can it prevent state
legislatures from overreaching?
What is needed is some middle ground between the rigidity of the
Article V process and the fuzziness of public polling. State constitutional
law can help provide that middle ground. As the formal constitutive
113. Cf. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 426,
at 326 (5th ed. 1891) (“[T]he policy of one age may ill suit the wishes or the policy of another. The
Constitution is not to be subject to such fluctuations. It is to have a fixed, uniform, permanent
construction. It should be, so far at least as human infirmity will allow, not dependent upon the passions
or parties of particular times, but the same yesterday, to-day, and forever.”).
114. See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2009) (arguing that the
Supreme Court is deeply engaged with, and rarely strays far from, public opinion).
115. Cf. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial
Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1029 (2004) (“The question we pursue, therefore, is how the
nation can strike a viable balance between the rule of law and the people’s authority to speak to issues
of constitutional meaning.”).
116. See U.S. CONST. art. V (describing the amendment process).
117. See Hills, supra note 8, at 17–18.
118. Id.
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documents of the sovereign states, state constitutions are not as hard to
amend as the federal Constitution,119 but are usually harder to alter than a
statute is to pass.120 Similarly, the decisions of elected state judges—who,
unlike the Justices, have a formal incentive to follow “th’ iliction
returns”121—are likely to be at least a rough approximation of the
constitutional values of their states’ citizens, since state supreme court
justices can be voted out of office if they deviate too far from those values.
State constitutions may be a particularly good measure of public
values when they are amended or reinterpreted in response to a Supreme
Court decision. This is not an uncommon occurrence, and at times the
Supreme Court has taken note of it. After the Court held in Bowers v.
Hardwick that a Georgia law prohibiting sodomy was not unconstitutional
under the federal Due Process Clause,122 the Georgia courts found that the
law violated Georgia’s analogous constitutional provision.123 Other states
followed suit, some by amending their constitutions and some through
court decisions.124 Of course, the matter could have come to rest right
there, since states are free to protect more or different rights than the
federal Constitution. But when the Supreme Court reversed Bowers fewer
than twenty years later in Lawrence v. Texas,125 it specifically relied on the
states’ constitutional response as a barometer of whether the right at issue
was “fundamental.”126 Thus, where the constitutional inquiry itself
demands some measure of current values—as modern due process doctrine
arguably does—state constitutional law may be a useful evidentiary tool.
State courts can therefore partner with federal courts in the shared project
119. Cf. Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1574 (2009) (“Today, fortytwo of the fifty state constitutions provide for the individual right to keep and bear arms unrelated to
militia service—by far the best expression of the constitutional commitments of We the People.”
(footnote omitted)).
120. See infra Part III.B.2.
121. Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, Does the Supreme Court Follow the Economic Returns?
A Response to a Macrotheory of the Court, 58 DUKE L.J. 1759, 1759 (2009) (quoting FINLEY PETER
DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY’S OPINIONS 26 (1901)).
122. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189–96 (1986).
123. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 26 (Ga. 1998).
124. See, e.g., Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332, 349–54 (Ark. 2002); Commonwealth v. Wasson,
842 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Ky. 1992); Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders v. Att’y Gen., 763 N.E.2d 38,
40–41 (Mass. 2002); Williams v. State, 722 A.2d 886 (Md. 1999) (holding at the trial court level that
sodomy statute did not apply to consensual, noncommercial, private sexual behavior, and the decision
was not appealed by the State); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112, 123–26 (Mont. 1997); Campbell v.
Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 260–66 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 204–05
(Tex. App. 1992).
125. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
126. Id. at 576.
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of identifying and expounding constitutional values.127
Even those who are skeptical of relying on contemporary
constitutional values would surely agree that state constitutional
amendments can be a better gauge of those values than, say, Gallup
polls.128 Even so, one might reasonably question how much weight state
constitutional doctrine should receive. It has been reported that a majority
of Americans are not even aware that their states have constitutions, much
less what they contain.129 If that is so, then it can hardly be said that those
constitutions reflect their values in any meaningful way. And yet it would
also be too much to conclude that citizens are indifferent to state
constitutional law or state courts. For evidence that people are perfectly
willing and able to engage with state constitutional law when it touches on
an issue that matters to them, one need look no further than the public
outcry in response to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision
validating same-sex marriage,130 the purge of the California Supreme Court
after the justices on that court were labeled “soft on crime” in the 1980s,131
or the Iowa elections in which three of the justices who extended
constitutional protection to gay marriage in 2009 were voted out of
office.132 To the degree that citizens actively engage with state
constitutional law issues, state constitutional law should serve as a
relatively accurate barometer of their current constitutional values.
3. Comparativism
Finally, the simplest argument for federal borrowing of state
constitutional law may be that it is a near-ideal form of comparative
constitutionalism.
127. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword, State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the
Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959, 973 (1985) (“The idea that constitutional
judges throughout the United States are engaged in a common enterprise, are colleagues in the effort to
shape and explicate a common tradition of political morality, is an attractive one.”).
128. Cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he views of
professional and religious organizations and the results of opinion polls are irrelevant.”).
129. Gardner, supra note 33, at 829 (citation omitted).
130. See Pam Belluck & Katie Zezima, Hearts Beat Fast to Opening Strains of the Gay-Wedding
March, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2004, § 1, at 26; Alan Cooperman, Massachusetts Clergy Are Divided on
Eve of Historic Same-Sex Unions, WASH. POST, May 16, 2004, at A01; John McElhenny, Church
Groups Rally on Gay Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 8, 2004, at B3.
131. See generally John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the California Justices: The
Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348 (1987)
(describing the debate and surrounding events leading up to the election).
132. See Krissah Thompson, Gay Marriage Fight Targeted Iowa Judges, Politicizing Rulings on
Issue, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2010.
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Comparativism has long been a part of the Supreme Court’s
interpretive toolkit, perhaps increasingly so in recent years. For example,
the Court has often relied on international and foreign law in Eighth
Amendment cases, beginning with its seminal decision in Trop v. Dulles133
and continuing through its more recent decisions in Atkins v. Virginia134
and Roper v. Simmons.135 International comparativism has also become a
part of the Court’s due process jurisprudence. In Lawrence v. Texas,136 for
example, the majority noted that the European Court of Human Rights had
recently struck down the United Kingdom’s sodomy ban in Dudgeon v.
United Kingdom.137 The Supreme Court observed that “[o]ther nations, too,
have taken action consistent with an affirmation of the protected right of
homosexual adults to engage in intimate, consensual conduct.”138 This kind
of international comparativism is thought to be especially useful when the
comparator countries have constitutional systems similar to ours.139 As
Justice Breyer has noted, the “Court has long considered as relevant and
informative the way in which foreign courts have applied standards roughly
comparable to our own constitutional standards in roughly comparable
circumstances.”140 And even when it comes to countries whose traditions
differ from ours, foreign constitutional precedents may be relevant to
federal constitutional interpretation “simply because of the enormous value
in any discipline of trying to learn from the similar experience of
others.”141
Comparativism is also prevalent among the states themselves. State
courts often cite one another’s decisions142 and borrow one another’s
133. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102–03 (1958) (plurality opinion).
134. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
135. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005).
136. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
137. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1981).
138. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576. See also id. at 573.
139. See, e.g., William Rehnquist, Constitutional Courts—Comparative Remarks, in 14 GERMANY
AND ITS BASIC LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE—A GERMAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 411, 412
(Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993) (“[N]ow that constitutional law is solidly grounded
in so many countries, it is time that the United States courts begin looking to the decisions of other
constitutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process.”).
140. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
141. Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265, 266 (2003). See also
Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address, 96 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 348, 350 (2002) (“[T]here is
much to learn from other distinguished jurists who have given thought to the same difficult issues that
we face here.”).
142. See also Gregory A. Caldeira, The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A Study of State
Supreme Courts, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 178, 179–80 (1985) (surveying scholarly studies on the
interactions among courts of different states); Lawrence M. Friedman et al., State Supreme Courts: A
Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 796–97 (1981) (summarizing data regarding state
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doctrine,143 even in constitutional cases.144 They do so despite the fact that
they are no more bound by one another’s precedents when interpreting their
own law than the Supreme Court is when interpreting federal law. Thus,
the federal courts borrow from international sources, state courts borrow
freely from one another, and—as noted above—state courts borrow from
federal courts. What is largely missing, however, is intranational
borrowing by federal courts. If international law can be a valid comparator,
then why not also the law of those sovereign states whose constitutional
tradition is historically, culturally, and formally enmeshed with the
nation’s?145
Of course, comparativism is controversial. Those opposed to its
international variant—including, perhaps most vocally, Justice Scalia146—
complain that it amounts to substituting other countries’ views for our own,
and imports principles from countries whose constitutional traditions
(assuming that they exist) are very different from ours. But these arguments
against comparativism are far weaker when American state constitutions
are the subject of the comparison, because “the differences between the
relevant state constitutions and the federal Constitution are much smaller
than the differences involved in the transnational comparisons that are a
staple of comparative constitutional law.”147 As described in more detail in
Part II, state constitutions—and the state courts’ gloss on them—are often
court citations). See generally Patrick Baude, Interstate Dialogue in State Constitutional Law, 28
RUTGERS L.J. 835 (1997) (examining state court references to constitutions of other states); Bradley C.
Canon & Lawrence Baum, Patterns of Adoption of Tort Law Innovations: An Application of Diffusion
Theory to Judicial Doctrines, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 975 (1981) (using statistical methods to study the
diffusion of state judicial doctrines).
143. See Shirley S. Abrahamson & Michael J. Fischer, All the World’s a Courtroom: Judging in
the New Millennium, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 273, 285 (1997) (noting that state supreme court justices
have become “seasoned comparatists”).
144. Margaret H. Marshall, “Wise Parents Do Not Hesitate to Learn from Their Children”:
Interpreting State Constitutions in an Age of Global Jurisprudence, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1633, 1641–42
(2004) (“As a state court judge, I have frequent occasion to look to the constitutional law of fifty other
American jurisdictions, even though other states’ interpretations of their constitutions have no
precedential weight for Massachusetts.”).
145. See Martha F. Davis, The Spirit of Our Times: State Constitutions and International Human
Rights, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 359, 374 (2006) (comparing federal citation of international
materials and state court citation of other states’ decisions); Note, State Law as “Other Law”: Our Fifty
Sovereigns in the Federal Constitutional Canon, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1670, 1672 (2007) (questioning
“the disparate attitudes toward the Court’s use of state and foreign law”).
146. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he basic
premise of the Court’s argument—that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the
world—ought to be rejected out of hand.”); Antonin Scalia, Commentary, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1119,
1119 (1996) (arguing against reliance on “international norms”).
147. Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000 SUP. CT. REV.
357, 359.
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substantially identical to the federal Constitution. Indeed, “The
development of individual rights under [state] Bills of Rights has been a
cooperative, common law–like effort by federal and state courts.”148 If that
development is to be truly cooperative, then federal courts should do more
to take into account interpretations of the state courts with which they are
supposedly cooperating.
B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST
The purpose of this Article is not to present a unified theory of
constitutional interpretation, but to consider carefully whether one
particular interpretive tool is worthwhile, and under what circumstances.
This section therefore aims to evaluate the arguments against increased
federal reliance on state constitutional law.
1. Conflicts with Originalism, Textualism, and Positivism
It would appear that originalists and textualists are unlikely to have
much interest in using contemporary state constitutional doctrine to
illuminate the federal document.149 Strict originalists focus on the intent,
understandings, and practices in place when the federal Constitution was
written and ratified.150 The modern constitutional practices of states—
particularly those states that did not even exist in the late 1700s—are
therefore presumably irrelevant except perhaps to the degree that they
elucidate or rely on Founding-era materials. Textualists, in turn, focus on
specific words in the federal Constitution, and often do so through an
originalist lens by looking for Founding-era sources151 or contextual clues
within the federal Constitution itself.152 Again, contemporary state
148. Force, supra note 42, at 130.
149. State Law as “Other Law,” supra note 145, at 1681 (“Under originalism, both contemporary
state and foreign sources are likely irrelevant to constitutional interpretation.”).
150. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 144 (1990) (“All that counts is how the
words used in the Constitution would have been understood at the time. The original understanding is
thus manifested in the words used and in secondary materials, such as debates at the conventions, public
discussion, newspaper articles, dictionaries in use at the time, and the like.”); Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 851–52 (1989) (explaining that the “‘originalist’
approach to constitutional interpretation” includes “examining various evidence, including not only, of
course, the text of the Constitution and its overall structure, but also the contemporaneous
understanding . . . , the background understanding . . . under the English constitution, and . . . the
various state constitutions in existence when the federal Constitution was adopted”).
151. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, Against Textualism, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 983, 984 (2009)
(citing textualist use of Founding-era materials).
152. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 788–801 (1999) (describing
the theory of “intratextualism,” under which the meaning of constitutional text is established in part by
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constitutional law seems unlikely to offer much useful guidance.
More generally, objections to constitutional borrowing of any kind
may be grounded in a certain view of legal positivism, a concept that has
made frequent appearances in debates about state constitutionalism.
Gardner explains that positivism “requires courts to approach a constitution
as an authoritative expression of the will of the people who made it, and to
interpret the constitution strictly in accordance with that popular will as it is
expressed in the document.”153 In other words, one cannot compare state
constitutional apples to the federal orange, because they were produced by
different sets of “the people.” Invoking this principle, some scholars and
judges argue that state constitutions are unique and must be interpreted in
light of their specific texts, original intents and original understandings,154
or in line with the character of the states themselves,155 rather than in
accordance with federal constitutional principles. One could easily turn the
argument around to say that federal courts should not borrow state law for
precisely the same reasons.
uses of other, similar language elsewhere in the document).
153. James A. Gardner, Whose Constitution Is It? Why Federalism and Constitutional Positivism
Don’t Mix, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1245 (2005).
154. See Gardner, supra note 153, at 1246 (“Sometimes a jurisprudence of state constitutional
positivism is justified on the ground that, because state constitutions are so easily and frequently
amended, it is often possible to discern ‘the framers’ true intent’ in a way that is sometimes impossible
to accomplish when interpreting the U.S. Constitution due to its age.” (footnote omitted)); Howard,
supra note 45, at 936 (“A state’s history and traditions should be considered. Early events often throw
considerable light on constitutional interpretation in states tending to strict separation of church and
state.”); Thomas Morawetz, Deviation and Autonomy: The Jurisprudence of Interpretation in State
Constitutional Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 635, 640 (1994) (“[S]tate judges sometimes justify deviant
interpretations of rights by arguing that the drafters of relevant state provisions had different intentions
from those of the federal framers.”); G. Alan Tarr, State Constitutional Interpretation, 8 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 357, 357 (2004) (“The interpretation of state constitutions, like the interpretation of the federal
Constitution, should be rooted in the text and original understanding of the document.”).
155. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 SW. L.J. 951, 965 (1982) (“I
look at the peculiarities of my state—its land, its industry, its people, its history.”); Judith S. Kaye, Dual
Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 399, 423 (1987) (“It should be
immediately apparent that the Constitution established by New York . . . reflects its own values, which
may or may not be identical to those held elsewhere.”); Ronald L. Nelson, Welcome to the “Last
Frontier,” Professor Gardner: Alaska’s Independent Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation,
12 ALASKA L. REV. 1, 5–8 (1995) (outlining Alaska’s unique history and traditions); Peter R. Teachout,
Against the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review Symposium on the Revolution in State
Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REV. 13, 35 (1988) (“The keystone is the development in each state of a
jurisprudence that is faithful to that state’s particular constitutional traditions.”); Don S. Willner,
Constitutional Interpretation in a Pioneer and Populist State, 17 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 757, 777–78
(1981) (outlining the distinctive qualities of Oregon that should influence its jurisprudence). See
generally R. Lawrence Hachey, Jacksonian Democracy and the Wisconsin Constitution, 62 MARQ. L.
REV. 485 (1979) (describing the origins of the Wisconsin Constitution).
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Nevertheless, there are reasons to think that the originalist, textualist,
and positivist objections are not necessarily devastating. Even the most
committed originalists and textualists use Framing-era state constitutions to
interpret the federal document.156 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in
Heller—which has been called the leading originalist opinion the Court has
ever issued157—does so,158 as does Justice Alito’s originalist opinion for
the plurality in McDonald.159 This makes perfect sense, of course, given
that the federal Constitution was modeled on state constitutions, rather than
the other way around.160 Moreover, just as originalists often look to
scholarship for illumination of original intents or understandings, so too
might they turn to state court decisions that are themselves originalist.161
The originalist and textualist objections to reliance on state law therefore
may not be quite as unqualified as they first appear.
The positivist objection, too, can be partially answered. As an
argument against federal borrowing of state constitutional law, the
positivist objection fails for the simple reason that the federal system is not
independent of state constitutional law. That is, the federal Constitution—
both in its explicit terms and in the constitutional culture it creates—is
deeply intertwined with state constitutions and state constitutionalism. The
will of “the people” who made the federal Constitution, as expressed in that
document, is emphatically one that respects states and state identity.
Indeed, the federal Constitution and all of its amendments were ratified by
the states, not directly by “the people.” Because state constitutions are
deeply intertwined with the federal Constitution—they inspired it and are
modeled after it—comparativism cannot be ruled out on the basis of the
156. Scalia, supra note 150, at 852. See also Powell, supra note 50, at 283 (“[B]oth legal history
and constitutional jurisprudence would benefit from enhanced attention to those traditions of argument
and interpretation that center on the fundamental law of the several states rather than on the federal
Constitution.”). See generally LUTZ, supra note 14 (arguing that understanding the U.S. Constitution
requires understanding state constitutions).
157. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). See also, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, News
Flash: The Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at A13 (“Justice Scalia’s
opinion is the finest example of what is now called ‘original public meaning’ jurisprudence ever
adopted by the Supreme Court.”).
158. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 577 (interpreting the Second Amendment’s first clause as “prefatory”
in light of the fact that “other legal documents of the founding era, particularly individual-rights
provisions of state constitutions, commonly included a prefatory statement of purpose”); id. at 640–42
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3037–38 (2010) (plurality opinion).
160. See LUTZ, supra note 14, at 97.
161. See, e.g., State v. Sieyes, 225 P.3d 995, 1005 (Wash. 2010) (“We follow Heller . . . [and]
look to the Second Amendment’s original meaning, the traditional understanding of the right, and the
burden imposed on children by upholding the statute.”).
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documents’ supposed independence from each other.
2. The “Political” Nature of State Constitutional Law
Holding aside for a moment the differences in substantive rights
guaranteed by state constitutions and the federal Constitution—an issue
described in more detail in the following subsection—there are also
important differences in their political responsiveness. The federal
Constitution, of course, is largely impervious to political concerns.
Amending it requires ratification by three quarters of the states, which is, of
course, an extremely high bar.162 And although Supreme Court Justices
may in fact tend to stay within the political mainstream,163 Article III
formally insulates them from politics by guaranteeing life tenure and
nondiminution of salary.164 This entrenchment leads to the most famous
constitutional “difficulty” of all—the countermajoritarian one—but it is
also essential to the Constitution’s role in protecting unpopular groups and
rights.
State constitutional law, by contrast, is not nearly so far removed from
politics, and therefore one might reasonably question whether it should
serve as a model for the federal Constitution. This overarching concern can
be divided into two arguments: state constitutions are too easily amended,
and state court judges are too politically responsive.
a. State Constitutions Are Too Easily Amended
The biggest difference between state constitutions and their federal
counterpart might lie not in the rights they protect, but in the relative ease
with which the former can be amended, altered, or replaced. This
malleability, in turn, contributes to further substantive differences between
the documents.
In contrast to the rigid requirements of Article V, state constitutions
can be amended through a wide array of methods, including popular
initiative,165 convention, constitutional commission,166 and legislative
162. U.S. CONST. art. V.
163. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 114 (describing tensions that result in balance between
majoritarian values and judicial review).
164. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
165. See generally DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE
REVOLUTION (1989) (describing the political trends and events that led to a much wider use of voterinitiated propositions nationwide beginning in the 1970s).
166. Robert F. Williams, Are State Constitutional Conventions Things of the Past? The Increasing
Role of the Constitutional Commission in State Constitutional Change, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP.
1, 22–26 (1996) (analyzing the rise in the use of constitutional commissions, and concluding that they
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proposal.167 Those mechanisms have been frequently employed to amend
state constitutions and even to replace them entirely. By Alan Tarr’s count,
“Only nineteen states retain their original constitutions, and most states
have had three or more.”168 Although a dozen state constitutions predated
the federal Constitution, only three states—Massachusetts, Vermont, and
New Hampshire—still have the constitutions they adopted in the eighteenth
century.169 Fifteen state constitutions were adopted in the final twenty-five
years of the 1800s, and eighteen more were adopted after 1900.170 As of
thirty years ago, the states had created a total of at least 145
constitutions.171
Even when state constitutions are not replaced entirely, they are
amended with dizzying frequency. According to one estimate, there were
4700 state constitutional amendments between 1776 and 1980.172 It should
be noted, though, that a handful of states bear disproportionate
responsibility for those numbers. By 1982, the Alabama Constitution had
been amended more than 500 times, the California and South Carolina
Constitutions each more than 400 times, and the Texas Constitution more
than 200 times.173 If anything, the pace has accelerated since then. By
2006, Alabama was up to 772 amendments, California to 514, South
Carolina to 485, and Texas to 432.174 But they are by no means the only
states to amend their constitutions frequently; most have averaged more
than one amendment per year of their existence.175
To the degree that state constitutions can be altered on a whim, they
“may also provide a fourth means to propose constitutional change directly to the people, in addition to
the convention, the legislative route, or (where it exists) the initiative process”).
167. See Teresa Stanton Collett, Judicial Independence and Accountability in an Age of
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 327, 334–35 (2010) (summarizing
the four methods of state constitutional amendment). Variations exist. Delaware allows for amendments
solely by the General Assembly, DEL. CONST. art. XVI, § 1, and Florida allows for a constitution
revision commission to meet every twenty years and propose amendments, FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 2.
168. Tarr, supra note 154, at 359 (citing TARR, supra note 40, at 23).
169. Gardner, supra note 33, at 811 (citing Albert L. Sturm, The Development of American State
Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS 57, 75–76 (1982)).
170. Id.
171. Sturm, supra note 170, at 57.
172. James A. Henretta, Foreword, Rethinking the State Constitutional Tradition, 22 RUTGERS
L.J. 819, 829 (1991) (citation omitted).
173. Gardner, supra note 33, at 820 (citing Sturm, supra note 169, at 75–76 tbl.3).
174. See ROBERT L. MADDEX, STATE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, at xxxiii–xxxvii
(2d ed. 2006).
175. Tarr, supra note 154, at 359 (citing TARR, supra note 40, at 24). See also Janice C. May,
Amending State Constitutions 1996–97, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1025, 1025 (1999) (noting that from 1996 to
1997 alone, forty-two states considered 233 amendments, approving 178 of them (citation omitted)).
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may not accurately reflect entrenched constitutional values. But this is the
inevitable tradeoff between timelessness and timeliness. State constitutions
tend toward the latter; the federal Constitution toward the former. Each has
its advantages and disadvantages. For example, whenever federal
constitutional interpretation requires consideration of contemporary values,
the ease with which state constitutions can be amended may in fact make
them a valuable and accurate barometer.176 Robert Williams notes that
“proposed amendments to state constitutions sometimes provide a forum
for resolving major societal conflicts.”177 Because they have been amended
so often, state constitutions contain a “layering” of different generations’
constitutional concerns.178 As A.E. Dick Howard explains, “State
constitutions are a peculiarly useful mirror of fundamental values.”179
b. State Judges Are Elected
There is a second potential problem with the “political” nature of state
constitutional law, one that springs not from the constitutions themselves
but from the manner in which state judges are selected. Because many state
judges are elected, and therefore politically responsive in ways that their
federal counterparts are not, they may bend in the wind too much to serve
as trustworthy and steady evaluators of constitutional rights.
The problems raised by judicial elections have been well covered
elsewhere and need not be rehashed in any detail here.180 In general,
however, it would seem that if state judges are attuned to the whims of the
popular electorate, then they will tend to underprotect unpopular rights and
unpopular groups. And while it may be true that most voters, most of the
time, do not know or care who their state judges are, they are nonetheless
capable of mobilizing whenever the courts stray too far from majority
public opinion in defense of unpopular people or principles. Perhaps the
most well-known example is the bitter and successful campaign against
Chief Justice Rose Bird and her colleagues on the California Supreme
Court after they struck down California’s death penalty statute and were
176. Howard, supra note 45, at 938–39.
177. Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 169, 176
(1983).
178. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 19 (2d ed.
1993).
179. Howard, supra note 45, at 938–39.
180. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 287–89
(2008). For a nuanced account of state courts’ treatment of “backlash,” see Neal Devins, How State
Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account: Toward a State-Centered Understanding of State
Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629 (2010).
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generally accused of coddling criminals.181 Other examples are not hard to
find.182 State judges trying to avoid a similar fate may feel pressured to
adopt federal constitutional law as their own.183 As Justin Long notes, “The
public, not knowing (or caring) much about state constitutions or state high
courts, sees only a state court refusing to follow precedent from ‘the
highest court in the land,’ and by that refusal, protecting a disfavored
group’s rights over the wishes of the electoral majority.”184
These political considerations raise concerns about federal borrowing
of state constitutional law. Most importantly, they suggest that “reverse
incorporating” state constitutional law—which for all the reasons listed
above is likely to underprotect rights—would effectively weaken federal
constitutional protections.185 One response to this concern might be to say
that state constitutional underprotection should not be a problem because
state constitutional protections cannot fall below the federal “floor.” But
that move, attractive as it may be, is not available. If state constitutional
law is used to define the federal constitutional floor, then it is no answer to
say that the federal floor will prevent underprotection by states.
There are other ways to minimize the problem, however. It is possible
that the political accountability of state judges (and the amendability of
state constitutions) might encourage them to read state constitutions more
expansively, knowing that their rulings can always be “corrected” by a
democratic majority.186 Moreover, for precisely the same reasons that the
181. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Friesen, supra note 81, at 34–36.
183. Cf. State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 815–16 (N.J. 1990) (O’Hern, J., dissenting) (objecting
to the court’s divergence from Supreme Court doctrine and arguing that “[t]o the extent possible, we
ought not personalize constitutional doctrine. When we do otherwise, we vindicate the worst fears of
the critics of judicial activism”).
184. Long, supra note 83, at 65–66. See also Williams, In the Supreme Court’s Shadow, supra
note 4, at 368 (“[S]tate courts now face mounting criticism for reaching ‘result-oriented’ decisions.
Without more of a justification, state courts may face criticism regardless of the persuasiveness of their
state constitutional analysis.”); Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional
Doctrines: Case-By-Case Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499,
1525 (2005) [hereinafter Williams, State Courts] (“When two sets of interpreters reach the same
outcome in a constitutional case, this increases confidence that the result is rooted in law rather than in
will.” (quoting TARR, supra note 40, at 175–76)).
185. Those who believe that federal constitutional rights are already too expansive are unlikely to
be troubled by this, of course.
186. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. O’Neal, 339 N.E.2d 676, 694 (Mass. 1975) (Hennessey, J.,
concurring) (“[I]f the present will of the people of the Commonwealth is that capital punishment should
be permitted in some or all cases of murder in the first degree, procedures for amendment of the State
Constitution which are relatively speedy, but still require time for reasonable reflection, are available to
accomplish that end.”); Schapiro, supra note 110, at 1453 (“[T]heir greater accountability might render
state judges more willing to read state constitutional guarantees expansively.”); Robert S. Thompson,
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malleability of state constitutions makes them particularly good markers of
current constitutional values, so too should the electability of state judges
make them especially accurate expositors of those values. Their articulation
of constitutional values may well lead to a “reinvigoration of the discursive
ground of a democratic order committed to the rule of law,” in part because
state courts’ “institutional position can be thought of as intermediate
between that of federal judges and that of elected representatives.”187
3. The Impossibility or Unhelpfulness of Comparison
A final group of objections centers on the basic idea that it is either
unhelpful or impossible to compare state and federal constitutions.
a. State Constitutions Are Too Different
One argument against using state constitutional law to guide federal
constitutional interpretation is that state constitutions simply have too little
in common—either with the federal Constitution188 or with one
another189—for comparisons to be illuminating.
It is undoubtedly true that state constitutions differ from the federal
Constitution in the rights they protect. As noted above, state constitutions
generally protect at least the same rights as are listed in the federal Bill of
Rights. But some employ different and more elaborate language in doing
so.190 And in addition to those rights, state constitutions also typically
guarantee other rights not mentioned in the federal document.191 For
example, “every state constitution dwells at length on education, and most
have something to say about conservation and the environment; the federal
Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the California Retention Election
of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007, 2055 (1988) (“Subjecting state appellate judges to electoral
accountability conceivably justifies these judges in erring more freely on the side of overprotection.”).
187. Kahn, supra note 75, at 1155–56. See generally David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as
Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047 (2010) (arguing that election of state judges may
serve as a mechanism of popular constitutionalism).
188. Rodriguez, supra note 87, at 272 (“[S]tate constitutions differ fundamentally from the federal
constitution in their respective histories, their political theories, and the intra-state circumstances to
which they respond, if imperfectly, as instruments of public governance.”).
189. Ellen A. Peters, State Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law Tradition, 84
MICH. L. REV. 583, 586 (1986) (“State constitutions thus exhibit much greater diversity in origin and in
agenda—some were intended, for example, to facilitate acceptance into the union—than we are
accustomed to contemplate from a federal vantage point.”(footnote omitted)).
190. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 45, at 910 (“Religion clauses in state constitutions take many
forms. Some parallel the First Amendment. More commonly, they are both longer and more detailed
than the First Amendment.”).
191. Gardner, supra note 40, at 1028–29. See also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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Constitution mentions neither.”192 Indeed, federal constitutional law all but
disavows any government obligation to ensure or protect such rights.
In addition to the breadth of the rights they protect, state constitutions
are almost statute-like in their length and attention to detail. One commonly
invoked piece of evidence in this regard is the New York Constitution’s
direct regulation of the width of ski trails.193 The original, unamended
federal Constitution, by contrast, consists of fewer than 5000 words,
including signatures, and a vast amount of federal legislative authority
derives from only seven of them (“To regulate Commerce . . . among the
several States”).194 Given their detail, it is unsurprising that, on average,
state constitutions are four times longer than the federal Constitution.195
And even holding aside differences in particularities, federal and state
constitutions are differently situated for the simple reason that state and
federal governments are. The federal government, of course, can act only
pursuant to its enumerated powers, while states have the police power and
can act unless prohibited. The federal Constitution therefore grants power;
state constitutions limit it.196
These are important differences and should not be minimized. And yet
there are still areas of overlap. Although state constitutions may go much
further than the federal Constitution in terms of the rights they enumerate
and protect, they do tend to protect at least the same rights as the federal
Constitution. That, after all, is precisely the reason why state courts are able
to interpret their constitutions in “lockstep” with the federal Constitution.
And even where state constitutions differ in substance or detail from their
federal counterpart, a careful interpretive approach can take these
differences into account. For example, the right to privacy exists in the
federal system as an incident of substantive due process. Some states,
however, have adopted specific constitutional provisions to protect the
right, rather than relying on due process.197 Thus, a federal court looking to
state constitutional doctrine to determine whether the right to privacy is
192.
193.

Howard, supra note 45, at 935.
Judith S. Kaye, A Midpoint Perspective on Directions in State Constitutional Law, 1
EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 17, 18–19 (1988) (discussing N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1).
194. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
195. Sturm, supra note 169, at 74, 75–76 tbl.3.
196. Rodriguez, supra note 87, at 277 (“State constitutions are documents of limits, while the
federal constitution is a document of grant.”); Williams, supra note 177, at 178 (“State constitutions are
usually contrasted with their federal counterpart by characterizing the former as limits on governmental
power rather than grants of power.”).
197. Linde, supra note 5, at 182 (noting that by 1984, eleven states had specific constitutional
privacy guarantees).
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“fundamental” would need to look not only to states’ due process
jurisprudence, but also to other provisions in their constitutions. In other
words, state constitutional rights that lack federal analogues are not
necessarily irrelevant. They may simply be evidence of the kinds of rights
that the Supreme Court should recognize as unenumerated in the federal
Constitution.
Finally and relatedly, state constitutional doctrine is hardly uniform,
so for many legal questions it may be impossible to identify “what state
constitutional law says” about a particular issue. Obviously, whenever this
is the case, the Supreme Court need not defer to an imagined plurality or
unanimity of state practice. And yet state constitutional doctrine does tend
to converge over time, in part because state courts, in keeping with the
common law tradition, tend to borrow doctrine from one another.198 The
more they agree, the more weight their shared view should receive.199
In any event, these objections about differences could be raised about
comparativism of any kind. At the very least, states share a constitutional
heritage with the nation, have similar constitutional charters, and should
therefore be relatively good candidates for comparative study.
b. State Constitutions Are Not Good Enough, or State and Federal
Judges Are Not Up to the Task
A somewhat more pointed objection is that state constitutions and
state judges are not “good” enough to be useful in federal constitutional
interpretation, or that federal judges will find it impossible as a practical
matter to divine state constitutional law or employ it in any meaningful
way to federal constitutional interpretation.
It has often been argued that state judges are simply not as trustworthy
as their federal counterparts when it comes to the protection of
constitutional rights, in part because—as Part III.B.2 explains—they are
more subject to political pressures. Some version of this argument lies at
the heart of the debate associated with Burt Neuborne’s article “The Myth
of Parity,”200 which was published in the same volume of the Harvard Law
198. Gardner & Rossi, supra note 60, at 1231 (“A borrowing mentality emerged, as courts looked
outside of their jurisdictional territories to state constitutions to fill gaps in constitutional
interpretation.”).
199. See Gardner, supra note 40, at 1037 (“The more state courts agree among themselves, the
more influence their collective position may have upon federal reasoning in cases arising under the U.S.
Constitution.”).
200. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977). See also Michael E.
Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1457 (2005).
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Review as Justice Brennan’s ode to state courts.201 Neuborne dismissed the
“assumption of parity” between state and federal courts as a “dangerous
myth,”202 pointing to state judges’ “vulnerab[ility] to majoritarian
pressure.”203
State constitutional law may be subject to the same criticism. In a
controversial but influential article, Gardner described what he called the
“Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism,” arguing that a theory of state
constitutional interpretation was practically impossible and normatively
undesirable.204 Daniel Rodriguez adds that “[s]tate constitutional theory
remains a rather barren, mundane field, with little substantive controversy,
creative thinking, or paradigm-shaking.”205 And even those who disagree
with Gardner’s normative conclusions tend to agree with his descriptive
diagnosis.206 According to Hans A. Linde,
Most state constitutions are dusty stuff—too much detail, too much
diversity, too much debris of old tempests in local teapots, too much
preoccupation with offices, their composition and administration, and
forever with money, money, money. In short, no grand vision, no
overarching theory, nothing to tempt a scholar aspiring to national
recognition.207

Coming from a former state supreme court justice who supports a robust
system of state constitutional law, this is quite an indictment.
Moreover, just as state judges may be disfavored when it comes to
protecting constitutional rights and articulating a constitutional vision,
federal judges may be incompetent to utilize state law. Federal judges and
their law clerks are not likely to be experts in any state’s law, even though
diversity jurisdiction requires them to utilize it.208 And even if federal
201. Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 6.
202. Neuborne, supra note 200, at 1105.
203. Id. at 1127–28.
204. Gardner, supra note 33. But see Daniel J. Elazar, A Response to Professor Gardner’s The
Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 975 (1993) (criticizing Gardner);
Schuman, supra note 59 (same).
205. Rodriguez, supra note 87, at 271.
206. See, e.g., Schuman, supra note 59, at 276 (criticizing Gardner’s thesis, but noting that
“Gardner is surely correct in his conclusion that state constitutional discourse in most jurisdictions,
including the ones he surveys, is impoverished”).
207. Linde, supra note 5, at 196.
208. This is a problem for state judges as well, since their clerks are likely to be more familiar
with federal law. Douglas, supra note 60, at 1147 (“The fact that law clerks working for state judges
have only been taught or are familiar with federal cases brings a federal bias to the various states as
they fan out after graduation from ‘federally’ oriented law schools.”); Linde, supra note 5 at 177 (“Our
law clerks come prepared for nothing else.”).
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judges were inclined to look to state law for guidance, they would find the
path to be dimly lit: legal scholarship has largely remained faithful in its
monogamist devotion to the federal Constitution.
There are no straightforward answers to these objections. It may very
well be the case that some state judges are incompetent, or even that, on
average, they are less competent than their federal counterparts. But as a
practical matter, it remains true that “under our constitutional structure it is
the state, and not the lower federal, courts that constitute our ultimate
guarantee that a usurping legislature and executive cannot strip us of our
constitutional rights.”209 If state courts can be trusted alongside federal
courts as the ultimate guarantors of constitutional rights, then presumably
their efforts to articulate constitutional values are also worthy of respect.
IV. THE APPROACH IN PRACTICE
A. REVISITING AND ELABORATING THE THESIS: TOWARD A TAXONOMY
The relative weight of these arguments for and against borrowing state
constitutional law varies according to the constitutional question at issue
and the interpretive theory one endorses. What is needed, therefore, is a
taxonomy of areas for which borrowing is most likely to be appropriate,
and some indication of how much weight it should be given. A number of
considerations seem relevant.
First, borrowing of state constitutional law is undoubtedly more useful
when the states have spoken with a relatively unified voice—when their
laboratories have come up with similar results. The standard of review for
gun regulations, explored in more detail in Part IV.C, is a particularly
striking example in this regard because the states have been nearly
unanimous in endorsing a “reasonable regulations” standard of review. And
in the three areas of constitutional law described in Part IV.B—criminal
procedure, due process, and the Eighth Amendment—the Court has
generally employed a kind of head-counting approach that gives more
weight to state practice (some of it constitutional) the more widely it is
shared. Doing so helps minimize the appearance of federal courts
“choosing sides” when state courts disagree about constitutional principles.
Second, state constitutional law should be more relevant to federal
interpretation when analogous rights or issues are involved. For example,
209. Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 605, 627 (1981).
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more than thirty states have due process clauses whose wording is identical
to the federal clause.210 Accordingly, their interpretations of those clauses
should presumptively be entitled to more weight than those of states with
clauses whose language differs. Depending on one’s preferred method of
constitutional interpretation, the same could be said about other potentially
distinctive characteristics, such as original intents or understandings. But it
does not follow that state constitutional law should be relevant only when
provisions are clearly analogous. As Part IV.D argues, state practice may
be relevant to federal constitutional law even when the only “hook” is the
federal Due Process Clause.
Third, state constitutional law should be (and is) more properly
influential in federal cases in which the federal doctrine itself calls for a
survey of state practice. In due process cases, for example, the question is
whether a particular right is “fundamental,” and state constitutional law
provides the answer to the federal inquiry, rather than influencing the
question itself. This is not quite the same as relying on state constitutional
law as persuasive authority, since it essentially means counting heads
instead of evaluating reasoning, but it does suggest a broad and important
role for state constitutional law.
Fourth, state constitutional law is particularly useful when federal
courts lack necessary “practical” experience. Again, regulation of the
“individual” right to keep and bear arms provides a useful example because
it is a right that the states have recognized (and regulated) for far longer
than the federal government. Accordingly, federal courts can limit their
speculation about the particular consequences of a particular standard of
review or legal rule by simply looking to its impact at the state level.
Assuming that there is a valid “state” position on a constitutional
issue, the next major question is how much weight that position should be
accorded. That question can be answered in many ways, just as state courts
have developed many different methods for taking federal constitutional
law into account. At one end of the spectrum, one could imagine a system
in which state constitutional law defines federal law. For example, if state
courts have unanimously decided that pornography is not protected in their
own constitutions, then the federal courts might be compelled (absent some
extraordinary reason to the contrary) to follow suit in First Amendment
doctrine. Or, as described in Part IV.B.3, if states are nearly unanimous in
finding a particular punishment unconstitutional, then it could follow
naturally that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the punishment as well.
210.

Gardner, supra note 40, at 1029.
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This approach would take the notion of “reverse incorporation” quite
seriously—incorporation, after all, applies federal constitutional rules to the
states, rather than simply looking to them as persuasive authority. Relaxing
that standard slightly, federal courts might accord the states a presumption
of correctness, as state courts sometimes do with regard to the Supreme
Court’s rulings.211 If state courts feel the need to explain their departures
from Supreme Court rulings212—which are no more formally binding on
state constitutional interpretations than state court interpretations are
binding on federal law—then perhaps it stands to reason that the Court
should do the same when roles are reversed.
In keeping with the taxonomy sketched out above, these strong
versions of reverse incorporation or intranational comparativism may be
appropriate in some areas of law but not others. For example, a unanimous
state constitutional practice protecting a particular right would be almost
definitive evidence that the right is “fundamental” for due process
purposes. But such a rigid approach is likely too strong in other areas of
law. For example, if state law is relevant only to the degree that it is
convincing, then the uncritical adoption of state constitutional law would
verge on an inverted version of the justly criticized “lockstep” approach
followed by many state courts. In those areas of law, it may be more
appropriate for state constitutional doctrine to serve as a kind of persuasive
authority, influencing federal courts through the power of its reasoning,213
just as federal doctrine may at times persuade state courts.214 At the very
211. See, e.g., Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 82 P.2d 391, 393 (Cal. 1938) (“[C]ogent reasons must
exist before a state court in construing a provision of the state Constitution will depart from the
construction placed by the Supreme Court of the United States on a similar provision of the federal
Constitution.”); Alan B. Handler, Expounding the State Constitution, 35 RUTGERS L. REV. 202, 204
(1983) (“[R]esort to the state constitution as an independent source for protecting individual rights is
most appropriate when supported by sound reasons of state law, policy, or tradition.”).
212. See Developments in the Law, supra note 84, at 1357 (“When a state court diverges from the
federal view, a reasoned explanation of the divergence may be necessary if the decision is to command
respect.”); Friedman, supra note 51, at 109 (“[C]ommentators and jurists contend that state courts
should defer to U.S. Supreme Court interpretations absent some principled basis for distinguishing
otherwise textually indistinguishable constitutional provisions.”).
213. See Friedman, supra note 51, at 128–30 (describing advantages to robust state court
constitutional jurisprudence as “an interpretive counterpoint to . . . U.S. Supreme Court” doctrine, as
well as contributing to “[p]rudential interests in predictability and stability” in areas in which the Court
has had difficulty, such as search and seizure and religious liberty).
214. Gardner, supra note 40, at 1059 (“The likeliest explanation [for why state courts so
frequently copy federal constitutional doctrine] is undoubtedly the most obvious one: state judges adopt
the Supreme Court’s approach because they like it and think that it does a perfectly adequate job of
protecting the liberty in question.”). See also State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (Haw. 1974) (holding
that an “opinion of the United States Supreme Court . . . is merely another source of authority,
admittedly to be afforded respectful consideration, but which we are free to accept or reject in
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least, “whenever a state court dissents from the reasoning of a U.S.
Supreme Court decision, it offers a forceful and very public critique of the
national ruling, which can in the long run influence the formation of public
and, eventually, official opinion on the propriety of the federal ruling.”215
Over time, the power of these state court decisions may have an impact on
federal doctrine.216 In that way, a state court decision is somewhat akin to a
dissent in a federal case217—it is not binding, but articulates a reasoning
that other courts may find convincing.
There is yet another way in which state constitutional law can be
useful, even if it is not strictly binding. Some federal constitutional
doctrines require the Court to identify constitutional values—for example,
what rights are “deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition” as
evidenced by “[o]ur Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices,”218 or
what punishments violate “the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”219 In answering these inquiries, state
constitutional law can be important not because it is binding or persuasive,
but because it provides the answer to the question that federal doctrine
asks. In these scenarios, state constitutional law is itself the object of study.
Thus, where federal doctrine asks whether a right is “deeply rooted in this
nation’s history and tradition,” the relevant evidence may be whether it
is—not why it is.
Drawing a line between adopting questions and adopting answers
highlights another important distinction: that between tests and
conclusions, or reasoning and holdings.220 As noted above, state courts
seem perfectly comfortable borrowing the former from federal law.221
establishing the outer limits of protection afforded by . . . the Hawaii Constitution”); State v. Hempele,
576 A.2d 793, 800 (N.J. 1990) (“In interpreting the New Jersey Constitution, we look for direction to
the United States Supreme Court, whose opinions can provide ‘valuable sources of wisdom for us.’”
(quoting State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 960 (N.J. 1982) (Pashman, J., concurring))).
215. Gardner, supra note 40, at 1033.
216. See Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., Toward a New Partnership: The Future Relationship of Federal
and State Constitutional Law, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 729, 742 (1988) (arguing that federal decisions, to be
fully persuasive, should take into account state court reactions to their prior decisionmaking).
217. Gardner, supra note 33, at 831 (“The idea of dissenting opinions furnishes a useful model for
thinking about state constitutional variations.”).
218. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
219. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion).
220. Linde, supra note 65, at 929 (noting cases in which a state court “agrees with the Supreme
Court’s result but rejects ‘balancing,’ more or less ‘fundamental’ rights, ‘degrees of scrutiny,’ or other
Supreme Court clichés of the times”).
221. Id. at 951 (“In short, state courts seem content to copy whatever judicial formulas are in
fashion, especially elastic formulas that let the court reach its own decision on the merits, for which the
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Indeed, state courts have often been criticized for using the Supreme
Court’s “verbal formulas.”222 But even when state courts borrow the
Supreme Court’s “questions” (its constitutional tests and standards), they
need not—and do not—answer them the same way. It may be, for example,
that state constitutional law gives more or less weight to a particular
government interest than federal law does, or that the interest at issue
(public safety, for example) means more to states than it does to the federal
government.223 As Louis Bilionis has noted, “the constitutionally
significant facts may be different at the state and federal levels . . . . Indeed,
whenever a constitutional methodology admits a need to accommodate
institutional considerations, the possibility for different yet equally correct
state and federal results exists.”224 In other words, even if the equations are
the same, the variables—and therefore results—may not be.
There are also other, more nuanced ways to take state constitutional
principles into account. One is to acknowledge different standards, under
federal law, for state and federal action225—for example, requiring federal
gun control to satisfy strict scrutiny, but holding state gun laws to
reasonableness review. The possibility of varying standards was bandied
about during the incorporation debate,226 and various Justices have
Supreme Court’s current formulas are eminently suited.”).
222. Jennifer Friesen, State Courts as Sources of Constitutional Law: How to Become
Independently Wealthy, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1065, 1067 (1997) (“I want to question the uncritical
adoption, when giving meaning to state constitutional rights, of verbal formulas that the United States
Supreme Court uses to measure federal constitutional rights or powers.”); Gardner, supra note 33, at
766 (noting that states have “borrowed wholesale from federal constitutional discourse, as though the
language of federal constitutional law were some sort of lingua franca of constitutional argument
generally”); Linde, supra note 65, at 943 (“Adopting timeworn verbiage in applying similar
constitutional clauses is a venial sin . . . .”).
223. Cf. Linde, supra note 65, at 932 (“The diversity that the Constitution allows the states
undercuts these formulas because it leaves state legislatures free to give strong protection to a right that
the Court does not consider ‘fundamental’ and to disown a governmental interest that the Court has
found ‘compelling.’”); Williams, State Courts, supra note 184, at 1514 (describing state court adoption
of Supreme Court tests as a weaker form of lockstepping).
224. Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing Methodology and
Legitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1015, 1053 (1997) (quoting Louis D. Bilionis, On the Significance of Constitutional Spirit, 70
N.C. L. REV. 1803, 1808–09 (1992)).
225. Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153
U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1516 (2005) (noting that “today’s doctrine virtually always utilizes what might be
called a categorical ‘One-Size-Fits-All’ approach to those constitutional principles that apply to more
than one level of government” but arguing that this approach “is problematic because the different
levels of government—federal, state, and local—sometimes are sufficiently different that a given
constitutional principle may apply differently to each level”).
226. See generally Louis Henkin, “Selective Incorporation” in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73
YALE L.J. 74 (1963) (suggesting standards for selective incorporation of the federal Bill of Rights
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acknowledged it over the years.227 In some limited circumstances, the
Court has embraced such differential standards. For a few years, states
were held to a higher standard than the federal government with regard to
affirmative action, for example.228 And in Apodaca v. Oregon,229 the Court
held that a state jury’s verdict need not be unanimous in order to support a
criminal conviction, despite the fact that federal juries must be.230 And yet,
as Justice Harlan pointed out in his dissent in Baldwin v. New York, fortyseven states already required unanimity for felony convictions under their
own constitutions.231
The thesis that federal courts should more often rely on analogous
state law is anything but a radical normative claim, which makes it
somewhat mysterious that it is so inaccurate as a descriptive one. One
explanation might be that federal courts have diagnosed and are attempting
quietly to treat our “national neurosis” about federalism232 by—at least in
this small way—refusing to pay homage to the inflated importance of state
identity. Despite some state judges’ insistence on state-specific
constitutionalism,233 critics have argued that such positivism is impossible
to maintain, since states are neither culturally unique nor legally
autonomous. Paul Kahn, for example, argues that
[t]o rest state constitutionalism on an idea of the state as an alreadydefined historical community, with a text that can be interpreted to
reflect the unique political identity of members of that community, is to
try to build a serious legal doctrine on what may be no more than an
anachronism or romantic myth.234
against the states).
227. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3093–95 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 352 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring); Williams, In the
Supreme Court’s Shadow, supra note 4, at 395 & n.212 (citing opinions of Justices Burger, Powell, and
Rehnquist).
228. Compare Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563–66 (1990) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to federal affirmative action measures, but strict scrutiny to state measures), with Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227–31 (1995) (overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC
and applying strict scrutiny to all race-based affirmative action).
229. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972).
230. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 363 (1972) (noting that federal courts “operate[]
under the unanimity rule”). McDonald casts doubt on Apodaca’s continuing vitality, but did not
specifically overrule it. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 n.14 (plurality opinion).
231. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 117 app. at 138–43 (1970).
232. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis,
41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 905, 950–52 (1994).
233. ROSCOE POUND FOUND., PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF STATE
CONSTITUTIONALISM 62 (Barbara Wolfson ed., 1993) (referring to state judges’ “vigorous[] reject[ion]”
of the “call to turn away from unique state sources”).
234. Kahn, supra note 75, at 1160.
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Thus, any efforts to craft state constitutional law based on state identities is
doomed to fail. In other words, the constitutional values that matter—in
both state and federal cases—are national ones.235
But in the course of describing that objection, the strength of the thesis
begins to emerge more clearly. For even if states’ primacy as sources of
political power and identity has faded over time, it does not necessarily
follow that state courts are inadequate when it comes to articulating
constitutional rights.236 State courts, after all, remain charged with the
elaboration and enforcement of federal constitutional law,237 and, as noted
above, they generally have followed federal doctrine even when
supposedly applying state constitutional law.238 In any event, federal
constitutional law already is shaped by the states, since it “often
incorporates state law by reference, taking on local hues and molding its
shape to fit different and changing state law rules.”239 Thus, for example,
“legitimate expectations of privacy” under the Fourth Amendment are in
some sense dependent on background state law regarding property and
privacy.240 Takings doctrine, too, is a federal rule, but it depends on state
law to define what counts as property. When applying these doctrines,
federal courts have no choice but to consider state law, constitutional or
otherwise.
The more one moves away from the notion of states as separate from
the nation, the more useful state courts become as expositors of federal
constitutional values. If the lines between state and federal power and law
235. See Gardner, supra note 33, at 828 (“The tension between state and national
constitutionalism has been largely resolved in the modern day United States by the collapse of
meaningful state identity and the coalescence of a social consensus that fundamental values in this
country will be debated and resolved on a national level.”); Kahn, supra note 75, at 1166 (“Whatever
the differences in historical origins [of the states], those differences are less and less relevant to today’s
communities.”).
236. Force, supra note 42, at 127 (“Whatever future the states have as viable governmental
entities, state and/or local responsibility for protecting individual rights need not be substantially
undermined by the two factors cited most for the decline of the states: limited finances and obsolete
government structures.”).
237. Bator, supra note 209, at 605 (considering “the role of the state courts in the elaboration of
federal constitutional law and the enforcement of federal constitutional principles”).
238. See Johansen, supra note 62, at 317 (“[M]ost state courts have very little to guide their
interpretation of the state constitution other than a body of state case law dependent primarily on the
United States Constitution.”).
239. Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword, Lord Camden Meets Federalism—Using State Constitutions to
Counter Federal Abuses, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 845, 854 (1996).
240. Id. at 860. See also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1985) (noting that “[i]n
evaluating the reasonableness of police procedures” the Court has “looked to prevailing rules in
individual [state] jurisdictions”).
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have blurred,241 the proper response is not to ignore state constitutionalism,
but to recognize that it is part and parcel of the federal constitutional
system. State constitutions themselves “flourish in light of, and not despite,
the American constitutional system.”242 As James A. Gardner puts it, “a
state constitution belongs jointly to the polities of both the state and the
nation.”243 After all, the “American federal system . . . [is] a single
mechanism,” of which the states are a part.244
State and federal courts are therefore engaged in an interlocking
system of interpretation, just as their respective constitutions are parts of an
interdependent constitutional structure. The structure of American
federalism, in other words, need not be one that simply divides and
separates judicial power. It can instead be one in which various interpretive
bodies, both state and federal, are engaged in a shared enterprise of
articulating constitutional values.245 To a certain extent, jurisdictional rules
can encourage this kind of dialogue.246 But as an interpretive matter, the
conversation between courts must also include something a bit more
subtle—not just respecting each other’s space, but learning from each
other’s experience.
B. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS
Having described the arguments for and against the use of state
constitutional law in federal cases, and sketched a possible taxonomy for
areas in which it may be appropriate, the thesis can be tested against actual
constitutional practice.
As noted above, federal courts have never used—and still do not
241. Gardner, supra note 153, at 1256–59. See also Robert A. Schapiro, Justice Stevens’s Theory
of Interactive Federalism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2133, 2141 (2006) (describing a theory of “interactive
federalism” that “rejects the three key elements of dualism,” because it “does not seek to draw
boundaries between state and federal power[,] . . . does not prohibit the national government from
coordinating state and federal claims,” and “does not conceive of states as distinctive communities of
value”).
242. Rodriguez, supra note 87, at 289.
243. Gardner, supra note 153, at 1254.
244. MORTON GRODZINS, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM: A NEW VIEW OF GOVERNMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES 14 (Daniel J. Elazar ed., 1966). See also Elazar, supra note 204, at 976 (arguing that
federalism does not presuppose a hierarchy in which states are inferior).
245. Kahn, supra note 75, at 1148 (“The diversity of state courts is best understood as a diversity
of interpretive bodies, not as a multiplicity of representatives of distinct sovereigns.”).
246. Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and
the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1036 (1977) (describing the Warren Court’s habeas jurisprudence as
“structur[ing] a dialogue on the future of constitutional requirements in criminal law in which state and
federal courts were required both to speak and listen as equals”).
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use—state constitutional doctrine to nearly the same degree as state courts
have used federal doctrine. There are, however, some notable exceptions to
the general history of neglect.247 In New York Times v. Sullivan,248 for
example, the Court specifically modeled the actual malice test on “a like
rule, which has been adopted by a number of state courts.”249 And although
headcounting is difficult, it seems that around the turn of the century, when
state courts were populated by giants like Benjamin Cardozo and Oliver
Wendell Holmes, the Court was more likely to take guidance from them. In
Davis v. Massachusetts,250 for example, the Justices not only deferred to
the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that was being
appealed251—an opinion authored by Holmes—but also relied on other
decisions of that court penned by their future colleague.252 Notably, the
current Court is the first in history with no Justices who have ever served
on a state court.
The following subsections consider three areas in which state
constitutional law has had the most influence on modern federal doctrine:
criminal procedure, due process, and the Eighth Amendment. Together,
these examples both illustrate the arguments discussed in Part III and
confirm the taxonomy suggested in Part IV.A. Broadly, the Court’s reliance
on state constitutional law in the criminal procedure context reflects a
pragmatic form of learning from the states’ experience and growing
unanimity about such practical matters as whether the exclusionary rule
deters unconstitutional searches. This is essentially persuasive authority. In
the due process and Eighth Amendment contexts, by contrast, the Court has
looked to widely shared state practice as “objective” evidence of whether a
particular right is fundamental or a particular punishment is cruel or
unusual. These are more akin to a strict version of reverse incorporation—
using state constitutional law to define federal standard doctrine.
247. Holland, supra note 23, at 998 (“State court decisions shaped federal law in the areas of
judicial review, substantive due process, freedom of speech, religion, eminent domain, the right to bear
arms, and the rights of the accused.”). See also Friesen, supra note 81, at 28 & n.12 (discussing
examples of state constitutional law influence on Supreme Court decisions).
248. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
249. Id. at 280 (citing, inter alia, Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908)). See also THE
FIRST AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED 43 (Bill F. Chamberlin & Charlene J. Brown eds., 1982) (“[S]tate
courts played an important role in laying the foundations for a modern-day understanding of freedom of
speech and of the press.”); Deckle McLean, Origins of the Actual Malice Test, 62 JOURNALISM Q. 750,
751–52 (1985) (tracing the test from Sullivan back to Kansas Supreme Court decisions).
250. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 46–47 (1897).
251. Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113 (Mass. 1895).
252. Davis, 167 U.S. at 47 (citing Lincoln v. City of Bos., 20 N.E. 329, 330 (Mass. 1889)
(Holmes, J.)).
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1. Criminal Procedure
State constitutional law has had a direct influence on the Court’s
criminal procedure jurisprudence. Two examples in particular stand out:
the exclusionary rule and the right to counsel. Both demonstrate a
cooperative constitutional dialogue between the state and federal courts. 253
The exclusionary rule itself is generally thought to be a federal
invention. When the Supreme Court first employed it in 1914’s Weeks v.
United States,254 few state courts had yet done so under their own
constitutions or constitutional law.255 And Weeks, which predated the
Court’s modern incorporation doctrine, applied the rule only against federal
officials. Initially, in Wolf v. Colorado, the Court decided not to incorporate
the rule against the states.256 But by that time, at least sixteen state courts
had followed the reasoning of Weeks and interpreted their state
constitutions to require the exclusionary rule.257 And just twelve years after
Wolf, in Mapp v. Ohio, the Court reversed course and decided to
incorporate the rule after all.258 In doing so, it explicitly relied on the states’
independent embrace of the exclusionary rule.259 It noted that when Wolf
253. Other examples exist. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 795 (1969) (“Today,
every State incorporates some form of the prohibition [on double jeopardy] in its constitution or
common law.”).
254. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
255. See Force, supra note 42, at 148 (“Weeks was a precedent shattering case; neither federal nor
state courts which had followed the common law approach until then had anything else to rely on.”).
Robert Force slightly misses the mark with regard to state law, however. It seems that at least a handful
of states excluded unconstitutionally obtained evidence even before Weeks. See, e.g., State v. Sheridan,
96 N.W. 730, 730–31 (Iowa 1903) (finding evidence obtained with an improper warrant inadmissible);
State v. Height, 91 N.W. 935, 938–40 (Iowa 1902) (finding evidence obtained during a compelled
physical examination inadmissible); State v. Newcomb, 119 S.W. 405, 409 (Mo. 1909) (finding
compelled examination evidence inadmissible); People v. McCoy, 45 How. Pr. 216, 217–18 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1873) (same).
256. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949).
257. Id. app. at 33–38 (listing sixteen states as following the Weeks rule and thirty-one as having
rejected it). See also Randall T. Shepard, In a Federal Case, Is the State Constitution Something
Important or Just Another Piece of Paper?, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1437, 1448 n.54 (2005) (“[T]he
heretical influence of [Weeks] spread, and evoked a contagion of sentimentality in some of the State
Courts, inducing them to break loose from long-settled fundamentals.” (quoting 4 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 2184, at 633 (2d ed. 1923))).
258. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
259. Gardner, supra note 40, at 1039 (“[T]he Court was deeply influenced by an emerging
consensus among state courts, which it carefully and extensively documented, that suppression of
illegally seized evidence was the most effective way to deter constitutionally unreasonable searches.”).
Whether the states’ embrace of the exclusionary rule was truly “independent” is harder to say. It is
entirely possible that by announcing the rule in Weeks, the Court influenced the states and thereby
helped manufacture the majority it later found relevant.
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was decided in 1949, “almost two-thirds of the States were opposed to the
use of the exclusionary rule,”260 but that by the time of Mapp in 1961,
“more than half of those since passing upon it, by their own legislative or
judicial decision, have wholly or partly adopted or adhered” to it.261 The
Court especially emphasized the ruling of the California Supreme Court in
People v. Cahan,262 which concluded that the exclusionary rule was the
only remedy that could ensure compliance with constitutional
guarantees.263 The Court therefore relied on the states not just as
independent expositors of constitutional values, but as laboratories whose
practical experience with constitutional rules was enlightening. Notably,
Justice Clark’s opinion for the Court in Mapp also specifically addressed
then-Judge Cardozo’s rejection of the exclusionary rule in New York,264
saying that “the force of [Cardozo’s] reasoning has been largely vitiated by
later decisions of this Court.”265 That the Mapp majority felt it appropriate
to respond to the contrary reasoning of a state court is notable, if only to
demonstrate how a state judge with Cardozo’s standing and influence can
command respect.
The state-federal constitutional dialogue about the exclusionary rule
has continued, though increasingly it seems that only state courts are
listening. The Court has progressively limited the reach of the exclusionary
rule since incorporating it against the states in Mapp. In United States v.
Leon,266 for example, the Court held that the purpose of the exclusionary
rule was to deter future police misconduct,267 and that it therefore should
not apply in cases in which police officers rely on a warrant they believe in
good faith to be valid.268 At least twenty state courts, however, have
rejected both the deterrence rationale and the good faith exception.269
Perhaps the Court will revisit Leon’s reasoning and rule if that number
reaches the fifty percent figure that seemed so significant in Mapp.
State constitutional law has also been influential in the Court’s right to
260. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651.
261. Id. See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 app. at 224–25 (1960) (noting that twentysix states had voluntarily adopted the exclusionary rule by 1960).
262. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 651.
263. See People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 911–12 (Cal. 1955).
264. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 653.
265. Id. (referring to Cardozo’s opinion in People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585 (N.Y. 1926)).
266. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
267. Id. at 906 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
268. Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 (quoting United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 539 (1975)).
269. Friesen, supra note 222, at 1080. See generally Leigh A. Morrissey, Note, State Courts
Reject Leon on State Constitutional Grounds: A Defense of Reactive Rulings, 47 VAND. L. REV. 917
(1994) (examining state courts’ rejection of the good faith exception).
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counsel jurisprudence. In Johnson v. Zerbst,270 the Court held that indigent
defendants had a right to appointed counsel in federal prosecutions. Zerbst,
in turn, quoted and relied on the Court’s earlier decision in Patton v. United
States271:
Consistently with the wise policy of the Sixth Amendment and other
parts of our fundamental charter, this Court has pointed to “. . . the
humane policy of the modern criminal law . . .” which now provides that
a defendant “. . . if he be poor, . . . may have counsel furnished him by
the state . . . not infrequently . . . more able than the attorney for the
state.”272

But Patton, in turn, was quoting from the Wisconsin Supreme Court
decision in Hack v. State.273 The state court’s reasoning had thereby
become part of the federal rule. And it was not simply the state court’s
language that influenced the Supreme Court. Thirty years after Zerbst, Yale
Kamisar noted that when in 1938 the Court held that the right of the
accused “to have the assistance of counsel for his defense” provided by the
Sixth Amendment included the right of indigents to be furnished counsel,
thirty states already afforded counsel as of right to all indigent felony
defendants.274 Robert Force concludes, “It was the states’ approach to the
accuseds’ rights which supplied the strongest support for the Supreme
Court’s rationale in Patton v. United States, which in turn, provided the
major authority for the decision in Johnson v. Zerbst.”275
There have been other occasions on which federal constitutional rules
followed state constitutional rules, albeit not always explicitly. The
principle of Batson v. Kentucky,276 for example, had already been endorsed
by some state courts before the Supreme Court embraced it.277 And long
before the Court extended Batson’s rule to cover preemptory challenges
based on gender,278 many state courts did as much under their own
constitutions.279 Similarly, when the Court held that the Sixth Amendment
270. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938).
271. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
272. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 463 (quoting Patton, 281 U.S. at 308).
273. Hack v. State, 124 N.W. 492, 494 (Wis. 1910).
274. Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on “The
Most Pervasive Right” of an Accused, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1962) (footnote omitted).
275. Force, supra note 42, at 145.
276. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (prohibiting preemptory challenges in jury
selection based on race).
277. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 761–62 (Cal. 1978).
278. See J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128–29 (1994).
279. See, e.g., State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 849–50 (Haw. 1990); Commonwealth v. Hyatt,
568 N.E.2d 1148, 1150 (Mass. 1991); State v. Gonzales, 808 P.2d 40, 49–50 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
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prohibits the exclusion of women from juries, it noted that this conclusion
was “consistent with the current judgment of the country, now evidenced
by legislative or constitutional provisions in every State and at the federal
level qualifying women for jury service.”280
Criminal procedure remains a comparatively rich area of dialogue
between state and federal courts. Indeed, in many ways it was the Burger
Court’s perceived restriction of constitutional criminal procedure rights that
first inspired the “New Judicial Federalism.”281 And there may be a special
reason for this, which is that federalism concerns—and concomitant respect
for the states’ governmental interests—are especially strong in the context
of criminal prosecutions.282 Perhaps, then, criminal procedure is one of
those areas in which the underlying values of reverse incorporation—
respect for federalism and state expertise, for example—are particularly
salient.
2. Substantive Due Process and Incorporation
State constitutional doctrine has played a notable, albeit less direct,
role in the Court’s substantive due process and incorporation cases. This
may not be entirely surprising, since the inquiries in both sets of cases
focus on what rights are “fundamental.” State constitutional law can serve
as uniquely good evidence of what rights meet that standard. 283
The Supreme Court considered the Due Process Clause only twice
between 1789 and 1868.284 State courts therefore had an opportunity to
define many of the relevant terms—“deprive,” “liberty,” and “property”—
before federal courts did.285 When the Court eventually embraced the
concept of substantive due process and a corresponding protection of
280. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533 (1975).
281. George R. Moore, Note, Expanding Criminal Procedural Rights Under State Constitutions,
33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 909, 915 (1976) (“[A] rapidly increasing number of state courts have declined
to follow Supreme Court decisions in the criminal law area, and have established higher standards
within their respective states based upon the authority of state constitutions.”). See also supra note 77.
282. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976) (“The deference we owe to the
decisions of the state legislatures under our federal system . . . is enhanced where the specification of
punishments is concerned, for ‘these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy.’” (quoting Gore v.
United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958))).
283. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (“A rule adopted with such unanimous
accord reflects, if it does not establish, the inherent right to have counsel appointed, at least in cases like
the present, and lends convincing support to the conclusion we have reached as to the fundamental
nature of that right.”).
284. Charles Warren, The New “Liberty” Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV.
431, 441 (1926).
285. Id.
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unenumerated rights, its definition of those rights depended on whether the
right was a “fundamental principle[] of liberty and justice”286 or “implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty.”287 The question essentially boiled down
to whether there was a tradition protecting the right,288 an inquiry for which
state constitutional law—and the states’ longer tradition of due process
jurisprudence—has proven particularly useful.
The Supreme Court’s sexual privacy decisions are illuminating
examples. In Bowers v. Hardwick,289 the Court upheld a Georgia statute
criminalizing sodomy. In doing so, the Court relied heavily on a history of
state regulation (implicit evidence that the states did not recognize a
constitutional right to sodomy), noting that before 1961 “all 50 States
outlawed sodomy, and today, 24 States and the District of Columbia
continue to provide criminal penalties for sodomy performed in private and
between consenting adults.”290 After Bowers, however, state courts, relying
on their own state constitutions, began “to extend the protection the
Supreme Court withheld.”291 In 1998, the Georgia Supreme Court itself
specifically rejected the Bowers rule, holding the very same sodomy statute
unconstitutional under the state’s Due Process Clause.292 The Georgia court
noted that it was not bound to interpret that clause in parallel with the
Supreme Court’s (concededly final) interpretation of the federal Due
Process Clause, despite the fact that the two clauses were nearly identically
worded.293 The Georgia Supreme Court was not the only state court to
reject the Bowers reasoning.294 Interestingly, the Texas Court of Appeals
was among this group, striking down Texas’s ban on same-sex sodomy.295
286. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312,
316 (1926)).
287. Id. at 325.
288. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710–19, 723 (1997) (reviewing state law and
concluding “we are confronted with a consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected the
asserted right, and continues explicitly to reject it today”).
289. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
290. Id. at 193–94.
291. Ann Althouse, Federalism, Untamed, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1219 (1994).
292. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, 24–26 (Ga. 1998).
293. Id. at 22 (“[T]he ‘right to be let alone’ guaranteed by the Georgia Constitution is far more
extensive than the right of privacy protected by the U.S. Constitution . . . .”). Compare GA. CONST. art.
I, § 1, ¶ I (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process of law.”), with
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .”).
294. See People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940–41 (N.Y. 1980); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415
A.2d 47, 49–50 (Pa. 1980); supra note 124.
295. State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Tex. App. 1992), rev’d, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994)
(striking down Texas Penal Code section 21.06). The Texas Supreme Court reversed and remanded
Morales on the grounds that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of the statute.
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In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court overruled Bowers.296 It
noted that many state courts, construing “provisions in their own state
constitutions parallel to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,”297 had rejected the Bowers rule. These state court decisions
made up a part of the criticism of Bowers that, as the Lawrence Court
recognized, had been “substantial and continuing, disapproving of its
reasoning in all respects.”298 Thus, as commentators have noted, “It is clear
that judicial federalism influenced the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Lawrence, as the Court found the trend in the states towards
decriminalization, a trend largely driven by judicial federalism, worthy of
consideration in its federal due process analysis.”299 Reviewing cases like
Lawrence, Gardner concludes that “particularly in the last fifteen years or
so, . . . . the Court has increasingly used the content of state law to provide
a baseline against which to measure whether any particular individual right
can be considered part of the fundamental liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”300
That question—whether something is a “fundamental liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment”—is essentially the same inquiry the Court
pursues when deciding whether to incorporate a particular provision of the
federal Bill of Rights against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Under the Court’s selective incorporation jurisprudence, the test is
“whether a right is among those ‘fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.’”301
And even before there was an incorporation doctrine, the Court looked to
state constitutional law when determining whether to apply federal rules
against the states. In 1833’s Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, for example,
the Court concluded that the federal Bill of Rights did not bind the states.302
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court was deeply grounded in state
See State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 947–48 (Tex. 1994). This set the stage for Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003), which would invalidate the statute yet again.
296. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79.
297. Id. at 576.
298. Id.
299. Fitzpatrick, supra note 34, at 1855.
300. Gardner, supra note 40, at 1040; id. at 1042 (“The U.S. Supreme Court’s approach in due
process cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment suggests strongly that state courts have the
ability to influence indirectly the content of nationally guaranteed liberties through their rulings under
cognate provisions of state constitutions. More to the point, it seems possible for state courts to use this
process to work actively, if slowly, to undermine Supreme Court interpretations of the U.S. Constitution
with which they disagree.”).
301. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67
(1932)).
302. Barron v. Mayor of Balt., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833).
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constitutionalism:
Each state established a constitution for itself, and, in that constitution,
provided such limitations and restrictions on the powers of its particular
government as its judgment dictated. . . . In their several constitutions
[the states] have imposed such restrictions on their respective
governments as their own wisdom suggested; such as they deemed most
proper for themselves. It is a subject on which they judge
exclusively . . . .303

Thus, state constitutional guarantees were originally seen as a reason
not to hold states to the terms of the federal document. And even when the
Court did eventually incorporate the federal Bill of Rights against the
states, it occasionally did so with an eye toward state constitutional law.
Wolf and Mapp, described above,304 are perfect examples—the latter based
the decision to incorporate the exclusionary rule against the states on the
fact that the states had already embraced it. Interestingly, the plurality
opinion in McDonald—the Court’s most recent and perhaps highest-profile
incorporation case—did not make use of a near-unanimous state
constitutional practice protecting the right at issue. Part IV.C discusses
McDonald’s approach in more detail.
3. The Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual”
punishment has inspired a somewhat distinct constitutional jurisprudence,
one which is heavily comparativist and draws on both foreign and state law
sources.
International sources have long played a prominent and controversial
role in the Court’s Eighth Amendment cases. In Trop v. Dulles305—perhaps
the foundation of the Court’s modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence—
the Court established an inquiry that looks to whether a particular
punishment violates “the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”306 That inquiry, the Court has long
recognized, can be advanced by looking to sources from other sovereigns,
including foreign and international sources. The Trop Court, for example,
concluded that denationalization was cruel and unusual, based in part on
the fact that “only two countries [out of eighty-four surveyed] . . . impose
303.
304.
305.
306.

Id. at 247–48.
See supra notes 259–67 and accompanying text.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 101.
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denationalization as a penalty for desertion.”307 In Atkins v. Virginia,308 the
Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of the
mentally retarded, noting that “within the world community, the imposition
of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is
overwhelmingly disapproved.”309 And three years later, in Roper v.
Simmons,310 the Court held that the Eighth Amendment also prohibited the
execution of juvenile offenders, again citing foreign law.311
Other examples of citation to foreign sources are not hard to find in
Eighth Amendment cases.312 For good or ill, the practice demonstrates the
Court’s willingness to construct federal constitutional law based in part on
the experiences of other sovereigns. But even more important in the search
for “objective indicia” is domestic consensus—that is, the practices of the
states. Interestingly, the Court has generally looked to state legislatures, not
state constitutions, as the most appropriate evidence of moral consensus.313
For example, the Court has stated that the “clearest and most reliable
objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the
country’s legislatures.”314 If state legislative enactments are useful
indicators of current social values, then it seems that state constitutions
307. Id. at 103 (citation omitted).
308. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
309. Id. at 316 n.21 (citation omitted).
310. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005).
311. Id. at 575–78; id. at 605 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he existence of an international
consensus of this nature can serve to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American
consensus.”). See Comment, The Debate over Foreign Law in Roper v. Simmons, 119 HARV. L. REV.
103, 103 n.9 (2005) (citing divergent scholarly opinions on the appropriateness and significance of the
Court’s use of foreign law for constitutional analysis in Roper); Ernest A. Young, Comment, Foreign
Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV. 148, 153–56 (2005) (arguing that decisions like
Roper use foreign law only superficially, as “nose-counting” to increase the denominator and make
divergent U.S. law look like “an outlier,” but without learning anything persuasive).
312. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 604–05 (“This inquiry [into international and foreign law]
reflects the special character of the Eighth Amendment, which, as the Court has long held, draws its
meaning directly from the maturing values of civilized society.”); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815, 830 (1988) (noting that the decision was “consistent with the views that have been expressed
by . . . other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the
Western European community”); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) (“It is thus not
irrelevant here that out of 60 major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death
penalty for rape where death did not ensue.”).
313. Hills, supra note 8, at 17 (describing reliance on state law).
314. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989). See also Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 (“The
beginning point is a review of objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the
enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question.”); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312
(2002) (referring to “the country’s legislatures” as the best source of such consensus); Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989) (“First among the objective indicia that reflect the public attitude
toward a given sanction are statutes passed by society’s elected representatives.” (quoting McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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should be as well, especially given the political responsiveness of state
constitutions.
C. THE SPECIAL EXAMPLE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
Perhaps the most important contemporary issue for “reverse
incorporation” is the use of state constitutional law in interpreting the
newly incorporated Second Amendment. In many ways, the Second
Amendment presents the perfect test of the thesis: nearly all state
constitutions recognize the “individual” right to keep and bear arms; state
constitutional law is well established and remarkably uniform in finding
that right to be subject to “reasonable” regulation; federal doctrine is almost
nonexistent; and (even holding aside the Amendment’s arguably
federalism-focused language) gun regulation seems to be an area in which
respect for the states’ police power and practical experience is particularly
important. And yet the plurality opinion in McDonald v. City of Chicago
seemed somewhat ambivalent toward contemporary state constitutional
law.
For nearly two hundred years, it was widely understood and frequently
held that the Second Amendment is essentially a federalism-based
provision intended to protect state militia from disarmament by the federal
government.315 In District of Columbia v. Heller,316 however, the Supreme
Court held that the Amendment actually protects an “individual” right—
that is, one not necessarily related to militia service—thus inaugurating a
new era of Second Amendment jurisprudence. In doing so, the Court did
not entirely reject the federalism-based reading of the Amendment,317 and
it did make explicit use of state constitutional law.318 But Heller left open
at least two major questions: whether the “individual” right to keep and
bear arms should be incorporated against the states, and what standard of
review should be used to evaluate restrictions on that right.319
315. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 637 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
316. Id. at 595 (majority opinion).
317. See, e.g., id. at 599 (recognizing that “self-defense had little to do with the right’s
codification” and “the threat that the new Federal Government would destroy the citizens’ militia by
taking away their arms was the reason that right—unlike some other English rights—was codified in a
written Constitution”). The majority thus apparently endorsed, to some degree, the view taken in United
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), that the Amendment was adopted “[w]ith obvious purpose to
assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of [militia] forces” and “must be
interpreted and applied with that end in view.” Id. at 178.
318. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 580 n.6, 583 n.7, 584–85, 590 n.13, 591, 600–04, 612–14, 629.
319. See, e.g., United States v. Booker, 570 F. Supp. 2d 161, 163 (D. Me. 2008) (concluding that
the Supreme Court “consciously left the appropriate level of scrutiny for another day”).
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The former question was directly presented and affirmatively
answered in McDonald; the latter was indirectly presented and not
answered. State constitutional practice would seem to be relevant to both
questions, and indeed state law played an interesting role in the various
opinions issued by the Justices. The plurality paid little attention to
contemporary state constitutional practice, despite the strong support it
would have offered for the decision to incorporate. Instead, Justice Alito’s
opinion took something of an originalist approach, citing only those state
constitutions in existence at the Founding320 or when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified.321 These were presented as evidence that the
individual right to keep and bear arms is fundamental. Similarly, Justice
Thomas’s concurring opinion cited state constitutional provisions and
decisions from the 1800s for the proposition that the right to keep and bear
arms is a privilege or immunity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.322
The dissenting opinions took a different lesson from state
constitutional law. Justice Stevens noted that “[t]he vast majority of States
already recognize a right to keep and bear arms in their own
constitutions,”323 but concluded that the answer to the incorporation
question “cannot be found in a granular inspection of state constitutions or
congressional debates.”324 On the question of incorporation, Justice Stevens
pointed to the states’ history of “extremely intensive, carefully considered
regulation” of gun rights, which, he found, “tend[ed] to suggest that” the
right was not “of fundamental character.”325 Justice Breyer also argued
against incorporation, but—as he had in Heller—focused on the still-open
standard of review question. And as to that question, he (and the three
Justices who joined him) endorsed the approach described in this Article,
suggesting that “the Court could lessen the difficulty of the mission it has
created for itself by adopting a jurisprudential approach similar to the many
state courts that administer a state constitutional right to bear arms.”326 He
320. McDonald v. City of Chicago., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3037 (2010) (plurality opinion) (referring to
“the four States that had adopted Second Amendment analogues before ratification, [and] nine more
States [that] adopted state constitutional provisions protecting an individual right to keep and bear arms
between 1789 and 1820”).
321. Id. at 3042 (“The right to keep and bear arms was also widely protected by state constitutions
at the time when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.”).
322. Id. at 3079–88 (Thomas, J., concurring).
323. Id. at 3095 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
324. Id. at 3098.
325. Id. at 3113 n.43.
326. Id. at 3127 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also id. at 3130 (noting that “many States have
constitutional provisions protecting gun possession” but that “those provisions typically do no more
than guarantee that a gun regulation will be a reasonable police power regulation”); id. at 3134 (“I think
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noted, ruefully, that the Court had declined to do so in Heller and then
again in McDonald.
Had the Justices given more weight to contemporary state
constitutional law, they might have found something of a middle ground:
incorporation of the right, as favored by the plurality and Justice Thomas,
but subject to reasonable regulation, as favored by the dissenting Justices
(and not ruled out by the other five). Such an approach would have been in
keeping both with the Court’s prior practice and with the thesis of this
Article. As noted above, the Court has often looked to state constitutional
practice to determine whether a particular right is “fundamental” and
therefore subject to incorporation. In the context of the Second
Amendment, this approach counsels in favor of incorporation, because all
but a handful of states have constitutional guarantees protecting the right to
keep and bear arms, and many of them explicitly protect the “individual”
right recognized by the Court in Heller.327 As if to drive the point home,
thirty-eight states signed an amicus brief in McDonald arguing that the
Second Amendment should be incorporated.328 The brief was no doubt
inspired more by politics than by fear of self-imposed gun regulation—
after all, a state’s elected officials do not need the Supreme Court to stop
them from passing gun regulations—but at the very least it suggests that
the states themselves favor the constitutional protection of an “individual”
right to keep and bear arms.329 Indeed, since nearly all states already
protect such a right, the incorporation of the Second Amendment would not
necessarily have much of an impact on them.
that it is essential to consider the recent history of the right to bear arms for private self-defense when
considering whether the right is ‘fundamental.’ To that end, many States now provide state
constitutional protection for an individual’s right to keep and bear arms.”).
327. See Volokh, supra note 21, at 192 (concluding that forty-four states protect an “individual”
right, though Virginia and Kansas are equivocal on the matter); Winkler, supra note 22, at 686, 711
(concluding that forty-two states protect an individual right to bear arms).
328. See Brief of the States of Tex. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, McDonald,
130 S.Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 4378909. Thirty-one states made the same argument in Heller,
even though incorporation was not an issue in that case. See Brief of the States of Tex. et al. as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 23 n.6, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07290), 2008 WL 405558 (arguing for incorporation of the right). Wisconsin, a late joiner, added an
amicus brief for the respondent arguing in favor of the individual right interpretation, but noting its
preference that the Second Amendment not be incorporated against the states. See Brief of the State of
Wis. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 4–5, Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (No. 07-290), 2008 WL
543032.
329. There is some historical precedent for states requesting that federal constitutional rules be
applied to them. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), twenty-two states asked the Court to
overrule Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), and require the states to provide counsel in state
prosecutions as well. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345. Three states urged that Betts be left intact. Id. at 345.
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But that raises the second issue left unanswered in Heller: What
standard of review should be employed to evaluate Second Amendment
claims? If the standard were to be set “higher” than that employed by the
states, it would displace their constitutional law just as surely as the Warren
Court did with regard to so many other individual rights. But if instead the
Court were to look to the states for persuasive authority, it would find that,
as with the incorporation question, state constitutional law is remarkably
uniform and clear330: every state court to have reached the question has
concluded that its state analogue of the Second Amendment permits
“reasonable” regulation of firearms.331 In other words, along with their long
history of recognizing a right to keep and bear arms, states have a
“tradition” of limiting that right.332 The “fundamental” right that is
protected, therefore, is a reasonable right to keep and bear arms.333
Nearly every factor discussed above counsels in favor of federal
adoption of the states’ constitutional rule.334 The states’ constitutional
provisions are similar in content and spirit to the “individual” right-based
Second Amendment, which, even after Heller, seems to have something to
do with federalism. States have far more experience than the federal
government when it comes to charting the lines between gun rights and
safety regulation,335 and the “reasonableness” standard they have
unanimously endorsed both reflects their collective wisdom on the subject
and permits individual states to tailor gun regulations to their own
circumstances. Indeed, the thirty-one state brief maintained that “[s]tate and
local experimentation with reasonable firearms regulations will continue
under the Second Amendment.”336 The states concluded that “[d]enying
local governments the power to nullify the Amendment will not increase
federal power, mandate any state action pursuant to federal directives, or
preclude reasonable state and local regulation of firearms.”337 The plurality
went so far as to quote that passage of the states’ brief, claiming that the
330. See supra Part IV.A.
331. Winkler, supra note 22, at 686–87 & n.12. Winkler has the unusual distinction of being cited
by name during a Supreme Court oral argument. Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, McDonald, 130 S.
Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521), 2010 WL 710088.
332. Brief of Thirty-Four Prof’l Historians & Legal Historians as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 2, McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521), 2010 WL 59025.
333. See Adam Winkler, The Reasonable Right to Bear Arms, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 597,
598 (2006).
334. See supra note 317.
335. See Winkler, supra note 22, at 715–26.
336. Brief of the States of Tex. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 23, McDonald,
130 S. Ct. 3020 (No. 08-1521), 2009 WL 4378909 (emphasis added).
337. Id. at 23–24 (emphasis added).
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incorporated Amendment “limits (but by no means eliminates) their ability
to devise solutions to social problems that suit local needs and values.”338
But despite quoting the states’ use of the word “reasonable,” the plurality
did not embrace it as a standard, instead reiterating the same categorical
carve outs established in Heller.339
Because the McDonald court declined to establish a standard of
review for Second Amendment claims, it is not too late for the Supreme
Court—and other federal courts now faced with the daunting task of
evaluating Second Amendment claims with little guidance from the
Court—to effectuate respect for state constitutional practice by adopting
something like a reasonableness standard. Indeed, the questions and their
relationship to state law are deeply intertwined. On the one hand, the states’
recognition of a right to keep and bear arms is among the strongest
evidence for the argument that the right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history” and thus subject to incorporation. On the other hand, one must take
note of what right the states have recognized: a right that can be reasonably
regulated.
D. OTHER APPLICATIONS
The “individual” right to keep and bear arms presents an unusual and
perhaps uniquely useful test case for the thesis of this Article, given the
similarities between the state and federal rights, the remarkable unanimity
of state law, and the near absence of relevant federal doctrine.
It may very well be that no other constitutional issue presents quite the
same clear-cut opportunity. But given the extensive borrowing that takes
place among state courts, and the textual similarities between their
constitutions and the federal document, it also seems likely that there are
other constitutional questions on which a large majority of state courts have
reached similar or identical conclusions. Perhaps most intriguing is the
potential influence of those widely recognized state constitutional rights
that lack explicit federal analogues. These rights may seem like unlikely
candidates for “reverse incorporation,” given their dissimilarity from
federal guarantees. And yet the federal Due Process Clause could
accommodate these rights just as it does others that are not enumerated in
the federal document. After all, the Court has incorporated nontextual
federal protections against the states, including the “beyond a reasonable
338.
339.

McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3046.
Id. at 3047.
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doubt” standard in criminal prosecutions.340 If incorporation can account
for these nontextual rights, reverse incorporation should likewise be able to
account for rights that are guaranteed at the state level, albeit in provisions
that have no direct federal analogues.
Most notable in this regard may be the right to education, which is
specifically recognized by forty-nine state constitutions—a convincing
majority, if ever there was one—and has often been invoked and enforced
by state courts. Of course, the federal Constitution has no such textual
guarantee, and the Supreme Court has found that it is not an unenumerated
“fundamental” right.341 But broadly recognized and accepted state
constitutional law suggests that the Court should reconsider. At the very
least, if the Court were to confront the question today it would be difficult
to hold that a right which is specifically enumerated in forty-nine state
constitutions is not “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,”342
as evidenced by “[o]ur Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices.”343
V. CONCLUSION
There is something unusual about the degree to which federal courts,
despite looking to international and scholarly sources for help in
constructing constitutional doctrine, have ignored state courts’
interpretation of provisions that are deeply intertwined—textually,
historically, and legally—with those of the federal charter. Given that state
courts are the judicial branch of a coequal sovereign in our federalist
system—a system to which the Supreme Court pays frequent homage—it is
surprising that they have not been able to catch the Justices’ eyes more
often. By describing the arguments for and against reliance on state
constitutional law in federal constitutional cases, this Article has attempted
at the very least to provide a possible and partial explanation for the
Justices’ negligence.
But there is also a slight normative claim here, which is that state
constitutional law should receive more attention from the federal courts
than it currently does. This is a slight claim for two reasons. First, since
federal courts have heretofore tended to ignore state courts’ construction of
their own constitutions, it would not take much to amount to “more”
340. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
341. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37–38 (1973).
342. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)).
343. Id.

DO NOT DELETE

386

2/17/2011 9:49:21 AM

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:323

attention. Second, it is a slight claim because there are many areas of
constitutional law in which the costs of looking to state constitutional law
will outweigh the benefits, either because state law is not well developed,
not uniform, or is so different that comparison is impossible.
Whatever these areas of law may be, the right to keep and bear arms is
not one of them. And so the Article concludes with a sharper critical claim:
the Court’s failure in McDonald to take into account the states’ unanimous,
long-held, and well-established constitutional conclusion that the right to
keep and bear arms is subject to reasonable regulation was a serious
shortcoming. Fortunately, since McDonald declined to set any standard at
all, the problem can be corrected by future courts or by the Justices
themselves, so long as they are willing to look to state constitutional law,
which shaped the federal Constitution at the Founding and could continue
to do so today.

